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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO WILLIAM JAMES 
The purpose of this theais is an exposition of William 
James's theory of the "stream ot thought" as it is developed in 
his Principles ~ PsycholoSl, and its relationShip to his later 
philosophy ot Radical EMpiricism. The soope of the thesis is con-
tined to two of the three general tields into whioh the writings 
at James tall, namely. the nature of the mind, and the .truoture 
and oriteria of knowledge. The third category, that at religious 
belief, has no direot bearing on the thesis topio and therefore 
will not be oonsidered. 
Since the works at such an extraordinary man as William 
James cannot be properly understood, or his diffioultie. and 
problems properly appreoiated, without a briet study of his baok-
ground, interests, and characteristics, we will tirst take up a 
study of James the man and his approach to psyohology_ 
William James was born in the year 1842 of a wealthy 
lew York tamily_ He spent DlUoh ot his boyhood, however, in 
Europe, and thus he acquired trom the beginning a defin1tely oos-
mopolitan outlook. Prom hi. father, Henry James, Sr., William 
reoeived a lasting intereat in religion and religious questions. 
1 
2 
The elder Jame., a man of leisure with a definitely independent 
mind in matters of religion, devoted muoh ot his time to theo-
logioal work •• 
The earliest peroeptible influenoe on William James, 
however, was not religion but art. His interest in painting was 
shortlived and was superseded by an attraction to the field of 
science. James reoeived his M.D. from HArvard in 1869, and began 
his teaohing oareer there tour years later as instruotor in 
anatomr and physiology. This position, however, opened the door 
to still another, and in 1876 he organized the first psyohologi-
oal laboratory at Harvard. Fourteen years later, his outstanding 
work, Prinoiples 2! PSloholoSl, appeared. Its remarkable lucces. 
established him as the leading psychologist of this oountry. 
Here again Jamestl varying career took another turn. Even before 
the publioation ot the Prinoiplel, hil interest in PS7chologJ 
began to wane, and he grew more and more attraoted to philosophy. 
Hi. last years were spent in attempting to develop a systematic 
philosophy, Which he termed Radical Empiricism. 
Prom this brief sketch we can see several oharacteris-
tics of James, the most obvious ot whioh are his restles. nature 
and his widell diversified interests. BVen a oursorl reading ot 
hi. work. reveals that James was a deepll religious man, though 
this trait found expres.ion more in hi. kindne.s to men than in 
his devotion to God. Hot only his father's k.en interest in 
matters religiOUS, but also, and muoh more striking" his strong 
3 
independence or mind showed up in the son. William, a voracious 
reader, shows the inrluence or a great number or philosophers and 
psychologists, though he steadfastly refused to accept ~ ~ 
the position of anyone ot them. As Perry says, "James benetited 
by the new movements in German, Prenoh, and English psyohology 
without surrendering himself wholly to any ot them."l T.ne early 
attraotion ot James to art shows still another taoet ot his 
nature. We perceive time atter time when reading his works that 
James was basically an artist~ a man with an imaginative tlair, 
a man given to brilliant flashes of intuition rather than to the 
rigorous and orderly rea80ning ot a scientist or a philo8opher. 
James tound it impossible to tie himself down to lengthy labora-
tory experiments or to the working out ot problems recurrent in 
his thought. ae left the laboratory work to his assistants, and 
borrowed extensively trom the thought ot others whenever he was 
forced to solve a particular philosophic problem. B1. strength 
lay rather in his ability to popularize and .ynth.size, and it 
was he more than any other who made psychological and philosophic 
problems understandable by the non-academic world. 
The literary atmosphere ot the James home, combined 
with the abundant opportunities tor m.eting the writers and the 
thinker. ot his day, stimulated William's mind to extensive 
1 Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character ot 
William Jame., Brieter Veraion, CambrIdge, Kaii7, 1948, 182:-
4 
reading. That he was greatly influenced by the .en whose works 
he had read is obvious trom allot his writings, but especially 
trom the Principles. The doctrines ot such men as Helmholtz, 
WUndt, Fechner, and Stumpt, ot the German school; ot Oharcot and 
Janet ot the French school; ot Bain, oarpenter, J. S. Hill, 
Darwin, and Spencer, ot the British group tigure prominently in 
Jases'a psychology.2 Their ideas were assimilated by James, and 
reappeared bearing the stamp ot his own approach and characteris-
tics. This approach consisted primarily, as Knox says, in "a 
strong sense ot individual values,") tor "Jamests philosophy was 
a study ot man, or ot lite."4 He did not regard biolo87, 
medicine, psyohology, philosophy, or religion as so many indepen-
dent, abstract disciplines, but as valuable sources ot light and 
information on human nature.S Bis "strong sense ot individual 
values," comm.nts Mr. Knox, ". • • must have tound expression 
under any circumatancea~ but the advent ot Darwinism gave to hi. 
mind the precise scientitic cue that it required."6 The intlu-
2 Gardner Murphy, B1atorical Introduction to Modern 
Psychology, New York, 1949, 192. --
3 H. V. Knox, The Philosophy ot Willlam James, New 
York, 1914, 3. - -
New York, 
4 Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencles, 
1925, 350. 
S Ibld., 350. 
-
6 Knox, 3. 
. 
enoe ot Darwin in Ja.es's psychology, aooording to the same 
writer, n • • • consista primarily in a special applioation to 
animal and human consoiousne.s ot the Darwinian conception ot 
biological utility."7 
J .. e. was not, however, the first to apply the conoept 
ot evolution to the explanation ot the human mind. Herbert 
Spencer had preceded him in this in his treatment of the lite ot 
the mind as a process ot oontinuous adjustment to its external 
enVironment. But Spenoer had detined adjustment as adaptation, 
thus a •• igning a pa.sive role to the mind. To this James dis-
sented vigorousl,. He too stres.ed Darwin's theory ot accidental 
or spontaneoua variation, but he denied that this variation was 
to be attributed to environment alone. Hi. position, characteri' 
tically empirical, was that the tact. ot psychology could not be 
explained without restoring to the mind that .pontaneous produc-
tivity which Spencer had ignored. 8 
7 Ibid., 9. Mr. Knox hal a briet but helpful com-
parison ot Darwin and James: "The secret ot Darwin's scientific 
succes. was his firm grasp ot the prinCiple that a genuine ex-
planation of biological phenomena can only be given in biological 
ter .. ; and that, .are particularly, an explanation ot organic 
evolution must be couched in terms of the interest of the 
organism. Bow .the pursuance of tuture enas, and the choice ot 
means for their attainment, are the mark and criterion of the 
presence of mentality in a phenomenon.' B7 conneoting this with 
the Darwinian standpoint, the soiences ot biology and psyohology 
can be rendered essentially continuous." 
8 Lloyd Morris, William James, Xew York, 1950, 15. 
6 
. 
Thus we see the influence ot two men, the one a soien-
tist and the other a philosopher, on James the psychologist. 
From the scientist he took his approach to psyohology, adapting 
the theory and methods of biologJ with scarcely any change but 
that necessary tor the application of the theory of evolution to 
the mind prooess. From the philosopher he took the idea of 
applying this theory of evolution to psychology, but ohanged the 
method ot application to agree with his own position on the 
nature ot the mind. 
James was similarly influenoed later in his oareer by 
other thinkers and writera. For example, the solution to his 
tamous "apiritua1 criaia" was lnapired by Renouvierta second 
Essaia, as James tells us in his work The Will to ae1leve. 9 And 
--_ ................. --
again in hia laat series of lectures, published under the title 
A Pluralistic Universe, he found the solution to a aerious philo-
-
sophie di1emma10 in the writings ot aenri Sergson. l1 In the 
aame series of 1eotures we learn that James was led to eonalder, 
under the intluence ot Pechner, the plausibility ot a "world 
soul," or, at least, of some higher torm of consciousness.12 
9 Perry,!he Thought and Character of William James, 
Brieter Version, 121:-- --- --
10 Either to give up the logic ot identity, or to 
accept human experience as tundamentally irrational. 
11 
1943,. 214. 
William Jame., A Pluralistic ~Un_i~v_e_r_s_e, Xew York, 
--------
7 
. 
We have thus leen Jame. taking his oue trom Darwin, 
following the path ot Spenoer (though disagreeing with him in 
many partioulars), and tinding the solution ot several major 
proble.s in the writing. ot Renouvier, Bergson, and Feohner. 
These are but the outstanding examples ot the influence ot other 
men on his own thought and writings, and yet, in spite ot the 
large place whioh must be given to these men, James developed a 
number ot theories which were deoidedly his own. AmOng these 
were his "stream ot thought," his theory on the emotions, and his 
theory ot "pure experience," which waa so fundamental a point in 
hi. philo.ophy ot Radical Empirioism. It is the opinion ot his 
out.tanding commentator, Ralph Barton Perry, that the "stream ot 
thought" theory takes tirst place among his speoitically p.yoho-
logical dootrines, and, with the possible exception ot his 
theory ot the dependence ot knowledge on the Will, the "stream ot 
thought" actually stands as James's most important philosophio 
insight. 1) 
The purpose of this thesis is, as we have stated, a 
study ot the relationship between the "stream ot thought" and the 
basic tenets ot James's later philosophy ot Radical Empirici8m. 
That suoh a relationship exists 1s indicated by the tollowing 
analySi8 ot Dr. Perry: 
James's theory ot knowledge was developed trom this psy-
-
1) Perry, 195. 
8 
ohological standpoint, and ia throughout dominated by 
ita two main charaoteristics: its emphasis on the cate-
goriea of interest and practicel and its reduotion or 
relations, substances, aotivities, and other alleged 
transcendent elements to the continuiti.s of sens. ex-
perienoe. The former motive in Jame.'s thought led to 
his voluntarism and pr~gmati.ml the latter to hi. 
'radical empirIoi.m.'L4 
In order better to understand the theory ot "stream ot 
thought," we will now con.ider briefly Jame.'. approaoh, methods, 
and u.e of term. in the Prinoiple. 2! Psyohology. 
James detines psyohology at the beginning of hi. work 
as fta .cienoe ot mental lite, both ot its phenomenon and its oon-
ditions."lS It may be noted here that this is not the etymologi-
cal detinition ot the word. In the original Greek, the words 
CPLJ'x", llY6 S mean "study ot the soul." James, however, strong-
ly objected to the "orthodox spiritualistic theory" ot the soul, 
according to which the diverse mental modes are atfiliated with a 
"simple entity, the personal Soul, ot which they are taken to be 
so many tacultative manite.tatlons."16 Though James objects to 
14 R. B. Perry, Philosophy of the Recent past, Hew 
YO:1-k, 1926, 186. - - - - -
lS William Jame., Prinoiple. ~ PSlcholoSl, 1950, I, 1 
16 Ibid., 1. Ot. I, 214 and 342-350 for discussion or 
the "soul theory," and its rejeotion. That James was tamiliar 
with the traditional scholastio explanation ot the soul is evI-
dent from these pages. Bis source, however, seems to be 
Oartesian rather than scholastic tor the explanation which he 
tollows (and rejects) divides all being into :1-es extensa, the 
phYSical, and res cOlitans, the mental. In the-ratter, two ele-
ments are distinguIs ea: an aotive thinker, or soul; and the sub-
stanoe ot the soul's thoughts, or oonsoiousness. 
"psyohologJ with a soul," he objeots Just as strongly to the 
assooiationist theory ot Herbart, BUme, the Mills, and Baln, 
namely, "psyohology without a loul." This group tried to explain 
mental phenomena by oommon elements ~ the divers. mental taotl 
rather than by a common agent behind them. To James, neither 
position was satiltaotory beoauae neither .xplained auch problems 
as why our memory olinga more easily to the near than to the 
remote, or why our memory Ihou1d lose its grasp ot proper names 
sooner than abltract.17 
Sinoe psyoho10gy is "a loienoe ot mental lite," the 
next question to be determined il that ot the presence ot mental 
lite. Oonoerning this question James says, "The pursuance ot 
tuture ends and the ohoiee ot .eans tor their attainment are • • 
the mark and oriterion ot the presenoe ot mentality In a 
phenomenon. MlB 
!he solence of psychology, 11ke Any other natural 
soianoe, assumes oertain data unoritically, namely, "that 
thoughts sucoessively occur, and that they know objeots In a 
world whloh the psychologist also knows. n19 In other words, the 
psyohologist .ssumes a "thorough-going duallsm."20 He supposes 
17 ~ .. 3. 
IB ~., B. 
19 Ibid. , 
-
197. 
20 Ibid., 21B. 
-
10 
two elements, a mind knowing and a thing known, and treats the. 
as irreducible. At the time ot writing the Prinoiple., James was 
detinitely committed to dualism, though Perry says, "This dualism 
was a provisional doctrine by whioh James the psychologist hoped 
to eliminate and postpone a question on whioh Jame. the philo-
sopher had not made up his mind. "21 The "question" to whioh 
Perry refers was mentioned by James early in his writing when he 
distinguished between the assumptions ot a man as a psyohologist 
and "whatever monistic philosophy he may, as an individual who 
has the right also to be a metaphysician, have in reserve."22 
Concerning the use ot oommon terms in the Prinoiple., 
Jame. had no one word for all states ot consoiousness as such. 
Expresaions like "mental atate," "state ot oonsoiousness," and 
"subjective condition" he tound too cumbersome. A word such as 
"teeling" vas, he felt, too often taken as a srnonym ot "sensa-
tion," a. opposed to thought, and the words "idea" and "thought" 
were commonly taken to exolude sensation. In this quandary, 
James oould make no defInite ohoice, though he preterred either 
"teeling" or "thought," and so he stated that he would otten US8 
21 Perry, The Thou~t and Character ot William James, 
Boston, 1935, II, 72.Tn anot er place Perry saYS, "In the 
P8{CholoSlohe had allowed himself the conveniences ot dualism, 
DU the w le trend ot his philosophical thought, both betore and 
atter the publication ot the PSiohologz, had been against that 
proviSional make.hitt." Ibid., ,273. 
22 James, Principles, I, 220. 
11 
both ot theae words in a wider aense than usual to indicate any 
state ot conaciousnesa. 23 
With this brier introduction to William James, we can 
more tully understand his problems and better realize his unique 
position aa pioneer in the field or American psychology. By way 
both of aummary ot th1s ohapter and introduction to the next, we 
may oite the historian Joa.ph L. Blau: 
James's psyohology marked a radioal shift in psychologi-
cal perspective and furnished a basis for an equally 
radioal ohange in phi 10 sophi 0 emphasis. The shitt was 
trom a psychology which stressed the mechanical assooia-
tion ot similar ideas to one in which mind was a dynamio 
and tunctional instrument ot adaptation to the environ-
.ent. Jamea's psychology broke down the separation be-
tween mind and body by considering what had been tradi-
tionally called 'mind' as man's conscious, intellectual 
behavior, and what had traditionally been called tbody' 
as the biological context in which this behavior take. 
place. Thus his work provided a psychological basis tor 
the overthrow ot the dualism ot mind and matter which 
had been the starting-point ot most 'modern' philo8ophy.~ 
23 Ibid., 186 • 
........... 
~ Joseph L. Blau, Men and Movement. in American 
Philosophy, H.w York, 1952, Sl~---
OBAPfBft II 
!BE STREAM OF !HOUGH'l' III !1'BE PSYCHOLOGY 
OP WILLIAM JAMES 
AIIong "&lU.ts sp.citicall,. Pl1choloSical doctrinel, as 
we hay. laid, the "stre" ot thought" ma1 be considered hi. out-
standing dev.lop •• nt. l l .. el begins hi. Itud,. ot the mind trom 
within with an anal,.lia ot the tact ot thinking, tor, he aa,.8, 
"The tirlt taot tor u. • • • al pa7ohologilts il that thinking ot 
10 ••• ort goea on."2 .e il uling the word "thinking" here indis. 
criminatel,. tor ev.r,. tora ot cognitive operation. 
Proceeding empiricall7 in hil anal,.sil, Jamel not •• 
tiv. characteristicI ot the proc.11 ot th1nkinSl that .ver,. 
thought ..... to b. part ot a perlonal conloiouln.ls, that 
thought il alwa,.1 changing within each perlonal con.oioulnell; 
that thought 11 I.n.ibl,. oontinuou. within .ach perlonal con-
Iciousn.ls, that it alwa,.s appears to d.al with obJ.cts ind.pen-
1 P.rr,., The !houset ~ Charact.r !! William James, 
Bri.ter Verlion, 19S;--
2 Jamel, PrinCiple. 2! PI,.choloil, I, 2~. 
12 
13 
dent of it.elt. and that it 1. int.rested in .ome parts ot the.e 
objeot. to the exoluaion ot other •• 3 
Taking up hil tir.t pOint, Ja.ea atate., "It ..... aa 
it the ele.entary p.yeh1o tact Were not thought or ~ thought 
or ~ thought, but !l. thought, ever,. thought being owned."4 1'0 
plyohologJ, theretore, can que.tion the exiltenoe ot peraonal 
aelve •• S lamel denie. that the notion ot peraonality oan .ean 
anything elsentially ditterent fro. what ia tound in the .tre .. 
ot thousht. Oonlequently he doe. not oonaider the abnormal oa.ea 
ot auboon.cioua perlonality, .uch •• thoae brought to the tore by 
hypnoti •• and automatic writing, to pertain to the pre.ent Itudy_ 
Btl reaaon 1. that in the.e abnormal oalea, the tracta ot thought 
indioate an organized ".eoond-selt" with •• mory, habit., and .en •• 
ot 14entit,.. 
What Jame. mean. 01 hi. .eoond charaoteri.tio ot 
thought 1. that "no .tate once lone can recur and b. Identioal 
wlth what it was betor •• "6 In other word., we never get the 
...... n.ation twic.. W. might think that we do, but upon olo •• r 
inapection, "what i. got twice ia the aam. object."7 The rea.on 
.3 Ibid. , 225 • 
-
4 Ibid. , 226. 
-
5 Ibld. , 226. 
-
6 Ibld •• 230. 
-
7 Ibid. , 
-
2.31. 
why we cannot get the same sensation twice is that "tor an iden-
tical sensation to recur it would have to oocur the second time 
in an unmodified brain. But this, strictly speaking, is a physio 
-
logical impossibility.u8 Bow it this is true in oonneotion with 
sensations, ~ .t.o_r_t.l0.r.i. it 1s true 1n connection with thoughts. 
Every thought we have ot a given fact is, strictly 
speaking, unique, and bears only a resemblance ot kind 
with our other thoughts of the same tact. When the 
identical fact r.ecurs, we must think ot it in a tresh 
manner, s.e it under a somewhat ditterent angle, appre-
hend it in difterent relations from those in which it 
last appeared.9 
It is this theory. based on physiological data, that made it im-
Possible for James to tollow either Locke or :Serbart, who "tormu-
late the mental tacts 1n an atomistic sort of way. and • • • 
treat the higher states ot con.ciousness as if they were all 
built out ot unchanging ide& •• "lO They held that Uit the thing 
is composed ot parts, then we must suppose that the thought of 
the thing is oompo.ed ot the parta 1n thought • • • If the thing 
i •• imple, ita thought i. aimple."ll 
Meanwhile a neoesaary consequenoe ot the beliet in per-
manent selt-identical psychic facts that absent them-
selves and recur periodicallT is the BUmian dootrine 
8 ~ •• 2321 ct. also 480. 
9 ~., 233. 
10 Ibid., 236. 
-
11 Ibid., 237. 
-
lS 
that our thought 1s oomposed of separate 1ndependent 
parts and 1s not a .ensibly oontinuous stream. That thia 
dootrine entirely misrepresents the natural appearanoes 
is what I next shall try to show.12 
James begins hi. disoussion of the third oharaoteristic 
of thought by a quasi-definition of the word "continuous." It 
is "that Whioh is without breach, crack, or division."l) The 
onll two breaohes that we oan oonceive to occur within a mind are 
either "interruptions, time-1!2! during which the consciousness 
went out altogether to eome into existenoe again at a later 
1I1Oment"J or "breaks in the g,ualitl, or content, of the thought, 
so abrupt that the ses-ent that followed had no conneotion what-
ever with the one that went before."14 !be MOst common time-gap 
is the fact of sleep, but there are others, suoh as those pro-
duced by anesthetics and drugs, in all of which there is defin-
itely telt a continuity of aelt. !hat is why "a present thought, 
although not ignorant of the time-gap, oan still regard it.e1f as 
continuous with certain chosen parts of the past.MlS 
Consoiousness, then, doe. not appear to itself ohopped 
up in bits. Such words as • chain' or 'train' do not 
desoribe it fitll as it presents its.lf in the first 
instanoe. It is nothing jOinted; it flows. A 'river' 
or 'stre .. ' are the metaphors bl wnioh it is most natu-
12 Ibid., 2)7. 
-
13 Ibid. , 237. 
14 Ibid. , 239. 
1S Ibid. , 239. 
-
16 
rally d.scribed. In talking ot It hereatter, let us call 
It the stream gt thought, ot consoiousness, or ot sub-jeotive lite. l 
The second type ot break among the thoughts which have the same 
sense ot belonging together 1. produced "by sudden contrasts in 
~ gualitl ot the suco.ssive segm.nts ot the stream ot 
thQught."11 In Jam.sts opinion, one who would maintain that 
the •• contrasts, how.v.r violent, break the continuity ot the 
stream of thought are guilty .lther ot "oontuslon" or ot a 
"superfiolal Introsp.ctlve vi.w. n18 This observer would contuse 
the thoughts th .... lv.s, taken as .ubj.ctiv. tacts, and the 
thlnga, tak.n as their objects. 
!he transition between the thought ot on. object and the 
thought ot another Is no more a break 1n the thoufht 
than a j01nt in a bamboo Is a br.ak in the wood. t 1. 
a part ot the conSCiousness as much as the joint 1. a 
part ot the bamboo. 9 
Jame. also places In the category ot superficial those who tall 
to not. that the previous object ot our consciousness Is taken 
together with the pre •• nt object. Hence, tor example, when a 
clap ot thunder breaks the silence, the object ot our oonsoious-
n.ss is not the thunder alone, but "thund.r-breaklng-upon-
16 Ibid., 239 • 
............ 
11 Ibid., 239. 
18 Ibid., 240. 
19 Ibid., 240 • 
............ 
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. 
• 11.ne.-and-oontrast1ng-with-it."20 In .upport ot this .tata-
•• nt, he reter. to hi. ohapt.r on n.rvou. aotiv1ti •• , wh.re he 
demonstrated that no _tate ot the bra1n can ba suppo.ed instantly 
to d1e away.21 Be admit., how.ver, var10u. rate. ot changa in 
the stre .. ot oon.ciou.ne.s. The.e are .hown by language 1t.elt 
"where .v.~ thought 1 •• xpr •••• d in a .entence, and ev.rl .en-
teno. clo •• d by a period."22 ae compare. thi. phenom.non ot 
change in consoiousness to a b1rd'. lite, tor "it s .... to b. 
made ot an alternation ot t11ght, and perch1ng •• "2) Enlarging on 
thi, compari.on, h. g1v •• the tollowing .xplanation. 
!h. re.ting-plac.s ar. u8ualll occup1ed by .en.orial 
1m.gination. ot 80m •• ort, who.e peculiarity 1s that 
they can be held betore the mind tor an ind.tinite t1me, 
and oontemplated without ohanging; the places ot tllght 
are till.d w1th thoughts ot r.lation" statio or dy-
namic, that tor the most part obtain between the mat-
ters oontemplated in the period. ot comparativ. r.st. 
Let u. call the r •• ting-place. the '.ubstantive 
parte,' and the plao.s ot Ilight the 'traneltiv. part.,t 
ot the stream ot thought.24 
Jamee admit. the great ditticultl In analyz1ng the.e tran.itive 
parte! but h. do., not tor that reason d.nl their exi.t.nc., or 
reduce the. to the more .ubstantive part., as .anl have done. 
20 ~., 240, ct. Franz Brentano, PSlchologi., I, 219 
21 J .... , Princlpl.s, I, 242J ot. !aine, On Intelli· 
sence, .ew York edition, I, ~J. --
22 J .. e., Prinoiple., I, 244. 
23 IbId., 244 • 
........... 
24 Ibid., 243 • 
.......... 
li8 
Ue 8ay., "It there be such things as f.e11ngs at all, then so 
surely, and more surely, do ree11ngs ex1st to wh10h these rela-
t10ns are known."2$ There are tee11ngs ot color, ot oold, 1t 1s 
-
true, but there are also re.llngs ot !!, ot ~, ot~. Why 1s 
1t that language reoogn1zes the tormer but refuses to reoognize 
the latter? The tormer ree11ngs are what Jame. calls substant1ve 
the latter, trans1t1ve. He clalms that men perslst 1n the error 
that where there 1s no name, no ent1ty can ex1st. Consequently 
they have elther den1ed the trans1t1ve states or have named the. 
atter the 8ubstantive percept10n to whioh they lead, thus 
bring1ng about greater and greater accentuat10n and lsolat10n ot 
the substant1ve parts. 26 
There are other modir10ation. ot oonsc10usne.s ex1.t1ns 
and, upon oareful analysis, even recognized, but the.e are 
generally treated In the .ame tash10n as the trans1t1ve states. 
"The ord1nary way 1. to assume that theT are all empt1nes.es ot 
oonsc1ousness, and so the sa.e state. But the teellng ot an ab-
.ence is toto coelo other than the absence ot a te.llng."27 
- ....... .;;,;;;. ... 
2$ Ibid., 24$. 
-
26 James considers th1s denial ot the transitive 
state. and the consequent accentuat10n ot the substant1ve state. 
to be the fundamental error common to both the assoc1ation1sts 
and the "sp1rltua11sts." Llkew1s., he considers hi. Ins1ght into 
thi. matter ot utmost Importanoe in h1. own explanation ot mental 
phenomena. 
27 Jame., Principles, I~ 252. 
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These tendenoies are what Jame. call. the "tringe" or "p.ychic 
overtone.,"28 and it i. preoi.ely the.e tendenoie. which con-
stitute the ditterence between "acquaintance w1th" and "know-
ledge about" a thlng. 29 The tormer ia knowledge without these 
psychic overtonea, the latter, knowledge with such overtones. 
The tourth characteristio at human thought 1s that lt 
appears to deal wlth objects lndependent ot it.elt. OUr oommon-
sense induces us to acoept the extra-mental exi.tenoe ot the ob-
Jeots ot our mind because we perceive that "there are .anI 
human thought., each wlth the aame objecta."30 In oonneotion 
-
wlth knowledge by the mind ot obJecta independent ot ltaelt, 
James takes up tor discusslon what he con.lders two erraneau. 
opinion.. The tirst i. that retlective consoiousness ot the 
s.lt is essential to the oognltive !unotlon ot thought. In other 
word., the mind, in order to know, must expre.sly distingu1sh 
between the th1ngs which lt know. and It.elt. Tbi. opinion Jame. 
28 Ibid., 2$8. 
-
29 Ibid., 259J ct. 221, also, Wl11iam James, The 
MeaniEj ot Tru~ew York, 1932, 11: quoting John orote;--
lip 10 ratIO PhilosoShica, London, 1865, 60: "We may speak in a 
double manner ot ~e 'obJeot. ot knowledge. That 11, we maT 
either use language thus: we know a thing, a man; or we maT us. 
it thus: we know such and sucll'lli1ngl about the thing, the un. 
Language in general, tollow1ng lta true logical lnstinct, dlstln-
gui.hed between t~.se two appllcatlon. ot the notion at knowledge, 
the one being Y-VW-V"I., nosoere, kennen, connaitre) the other 
being £.t cJ~vO(, .. , SCire, wil.en, .avoir." 
30 l .. el, Principle., I, 211. 
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denle. when he aay., "Thought may, but need not, In knowIng, d1.-
crlqinate betw.en 1ta object and itselt."31 Secondly, he objects 
to the misus. ot the word "objeot" by those who take It to ind1-
cate only the ".ubetantl •• kernal or nucleus ot con.olou.n •••• "32 
For example, In the .enteno. "Columbus dIscovered America in 
1492," most people would say that the object ot the qind Is the 
word "Oolumbus," or ~Amerloa," or, at most, "the discovery ot 
America." Jame. maintain. that it Is not anyone ot the.e taken 
sIngly, but the whole .entence. "!he objeot ot every thought, 
then, 1. neither more nor le.s than all that the thought thInks, 
exactlT as the thought think. It, however complicated the matter 
, •• may be."33 Thi. brings up again the qu •• tion ot a complex 
objeot ot thought and the assooiationist doctrine that whenever 
an object ot thought contains many elements, the thought it.elt 
must be made up ot ju.t .s many ide •• , one ide. tor each element, 
and all tu.ed together in appearance but .eparate in reality.34 
J~e., again, denies thia, .aying that "however complex the ob-
ject may be, the thought or it i. one undivided atat. ot con-
sciousnes •• "3S 
31 Ibid., 27$. 
........... 
32 IbId., 275. 
........... 
33 Ibid., 
.-........ 
275. 
34 IbId., 
........... 
2771 ct. a180 II, 14. 
3$ Jam •• , Princlpl •• , I, 276. 
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the tlnal oharaoterlatl0 ot the atream ot oonaolouane •• 
1. that "It 1. alwa7a Intere.ted more In one part ot ita object 
than In another, and weloome. and rejecta, or ohooaea, all the 
while it thinks. ".36 Our .enae. are nothing more than organs ot 
.eleotion, pioklng out ot what i. an "undistingui.hable, avarmin, 
oontlnuum, devoid ot distinction, • • • a world fUll ot contra.ta 
ot aharp accenta, ot abrupt ohan,e., ot pioture.que light and 
.bade.".37 Prom among the.e •• n.atlon., the mind ohooses agaln, 
.electing "certaln ot the .enaationa to repre.ent the thins most 
trull, and eon.idering the re.t a. ita appearan.e., moditied b7 
the conditions ot the mo.ent."38 !he perception. ot indiv1dual 
.en ditter a. to preoi.e17 what each one perceive. beoau.e ot the 
dltterenoe. 1n experience and in habits ot attention, but 1n 
general the whole human race agrees In noticing, .eleoting, and 
naming oertain detinite portlons ot "the orIginal world-stutt."39 
The one out.tanding oa •• ot oomplete diversIt7 in •• leotion 1. 
the .plltting ot the univer.e 07 each indivldual into two halv •• , 
name 17, "me" and "not-.e."40 11nee only the to~.r pertaina to 
36 Ibid., 284. 
-
37 Ibld., 285. 
-
38 Ibid. , 28$. 
-
.39 Ibid. , 289 • 
-
40 Ibid., 289. 
-
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a "stud1 ot" the mind trom wlthln."41 Jame. proce.da to study the 
"me" br a ayate .. tlc, empirioal 1nve.tlgat10n ot the meaning of 
"In It. wld •• t poa.lble aen.e, a man'. Self i. the aum 
total of all that he can call hla."42 Benoe a man can b. aaid to 
have a material aelt--hia bodr and all hi. pOI.e.sions, a aocial 
•• It--the recognition whioh he receives trom hi. assooiates; a 
spirltual selt--the p.rabie taoultles taken conoretely, and, 
tinally, what Jamel call. the "Pure Ego" or prinolple ot perlonal 
unlty. The scope of the word 1n the flrat two c •• e. i. obvlou •• 
The use of the word "selt" accordlng to the thlrd and tourth 
meanlnga, which expresa more properly what we mean when we uae 
the word, calla tor oaretul investigatlon. 
The "splrltual aelt" ma1 be consldered elther abstraot-
ly, accordlng to Its divlslon Into facultlea, or concretely, aa 
elther the entire atre .. of peraonal consciousne •• or the present 
".egment" or " •• ction" ot that atream. Jame. propoae. to con-
alder thia "aelt" abatractly first, In order to tind out which 
portlon of the stream --7 be taken a. a nucleua ot the 8ubjective 
11fe a. a whole. Be will take up later a dlscu.alon ot the 
".elf" In Its conorete aspect, when he dlscu •• e. the nature or 
Ibld., 2~ • 
.......... 
~.J 291. 
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the prlnclpl. ot unlty ln our con.clou.n •••• 
In con.ld.rlng the "splrltual .elt" ab.tractly, mo.t 
men would d •• crlb. lt ln the .... way--up to a polnt. "Th.y 
would call it the activ. elem.nt in all con.clou.n ••• , .aying 
that ••• there 1. a splrltual .omething in him which aeem. to 
S2 ~ to meet theae qualities and content., whil.t they .eem to 
come in to be recelved by It."43 HOwever, once they de.cended 
--
trOll. thia general de.criptlon to partlcular characteri.tica, 
their opinion. would begin to ditter. 
50.e would aa1 that it i. a .imple active .ub.tance, the 
.oul, of which they are thua con.cioul, other., that 
th.re ia nothing but • tiction, the imaginary beins 
denoted by the pronoun 11 and betwe.n th ••• extremel.pt 
opinlon, all lort. ot inter.aedlarlel would b. tound.44 
JaDlel mainta1na that thi. central part ot the ".elt" is felt, 
that "it il something w1th which we al.o have direct sen.ible 
acqua1ntance,"4S but linee h1s knowl.dge ot thla "aelt" i. 
arrived at by his personal introspection and ma,. theretore be, in 
part at least, inapplicable to other lndivldual., he propose. 
only hi. teeling in this _tter. He i8 most distlnctly aware ot 
-
"the collection ot the.e peculiar motlona in the head or b.twe.n 
the h.ad and the throat."46 B. does not claim that this i8 all 
-
43 Ibid., 
-
297. 
44 Ibid. , 
-
298. 
45 Ibid. , 300. 
-
46 Ibld. , 
-
301. 
that the "selt" consiats ot, but It the other portlona whioh are 
al 7et hldden are a1m11ar to thia ot whioh he 1. aware, then "It 
would tollow that our entire teellng ot apiritual actlvity, or 
what common17 paaae. D7 that name, i. real17 a teellng ot bodl17 
activltle. who.e exact nature 1. by mo.t men overlooked."47 
Since this il a. tar •• he can 80 In an analy.ls ot the "aplrl-
tual selt" 1n It. ab.tract alpect, he turn. now to a stud7 ot the 
emotlon. ot the ".elt." 
There exl.tl, aay' James, "an hlerarohical scale, with 
the bod117 Selt at the bottom, the splritual .elt at top, and the 
extraoorporeal materlal lelvea and the various .ooial .elvel be-
tween."48 Purther analYB1. ot the.e "aelve," In a man ahows that 
"each ot UB is animated by a direct teeling ot regard tor his own 
pure principle ot individual existence, whatever that mal be, 
taken merely as such."49 !he questlon immediately ari.est what 
1a this "principle ot individual existenoe"? It cannot be the 
inner nucleua ot one's spirltual .elt, that oollection ot ob-
acurely telt "adjuatments", nor can it be the concrete stream ot 
one-s thought, nor oan it be the indivisible Soul~.ubstancel nor 
oan it be the mere pronoun II tor none ot th.se arouse te.ling 
... 
47 Ibld., 301 • 
........... 
48 Ibld., 313 • 
........... 
49 Ibld., 318 • 
........... 
and connote emotlonal worth. What Is It then? James concludes 
that "lts own body, ••• first ot all, its friends next, and 
tinally its splrltual dispositlons, must be the supremely Inter-
esting objeots for each human mind."50 And agaln, "H1 own body 
and what minlsters to Its needs are thus the primitive objeot, 
instinctlvely determined, of my egoistic Interests."Sl 
After thls lengthy Investigatlon of the phenomenal self 
and the nature of self-regard, Jame. begins his study ot the 
"pure prinolple ot personal identitl."52 Here he comel direotly 
agalnst one of the most dlfficult problems of his psychology, a 
problem whioh had divided all prevlous psyohologists into two 
irreconcilable caaps. On the one aide were the "splrituallsts," 
who held either a substantial soul or a transcendental principle 
ot Identlty; on the other slde, the "assooiationists," who denied 
this principle, and held that all it amounted to waa a stream of 
passlng thoughts. James saw dlfficultles in both positions: the 
former gave no posltive acoount of what the soul or the trans-
cendental princlple might be, the latter contradicted the common-
sense of all mankind.53 
SO Ibld., 
-
.323. 
$1 Ibld., 
-
.324. 
52 ~., .330. 
53 Ibld., 
-
330. 
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James recognlzed the dltflculty ot the investigation. 
tor he state •• "The I. or 'pure ego.' ls a very much more dltti-
... 
cult .ubject ot Inquiry than the He. It 1. that whioh at aD7 
...... 
glven moment ls oonsolous. whereas the!! 1. only one ot the 
thlng. whloh It Is consolou. !!."54 It thls !. or thinker, 1. 
only the .tream at thought. then how explaln it. unity? It it 
1 •• o.ethlng deeper and le.s mutable, ju.t what 1. it? In his 
analy.is ot the empirloal He, Jame •• tated that "thought. whioh 
...... 
we actually know to exi.t do not tly about loo.e, but •••• to 
belong to some one thinker and not to another."S5 I. there, 
though. continuity 1n thi. thinker? Can he .ay, "I am the .ame 
that I was yesterday"? Th •• mpirical .elt, granted, 1. ea-
sentlally the .ame in the .ense that it 1. continuous. Thi. 
attribute ot oontinuity give. to the .elt "the unlty ot .ere oon-
nectedn.ss or unbrok.nn •••• a perteotly definlte pheno.enal 
thing ••• "56 Can the .ame be 8aid of the thinker? Or is there 
.uoh a thing? To this last question James replle., "f,hat there 
la .uch a prlnciple 1. the reigning doctr1ne ot both philo.ophy 
and oommon •• n ••• and yet refleotion find. It dlfflcult to 
54 William Jam •• , P.ychologz. Cleveland, 1948, 195. 
55 Jame., Princlple. !! P81chololl, I, 330. 
56 Jame., P'lchololl, 202. 
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ju.tit, the idea."57 In this dilemma he turned to a simile tor 
help in explaining his notion ot the "thinker." Acoording to 
this aimile, in which he use. the tigure ot a herd ot cattle, 
"the beaat. were brought together into one herd because their 
owner found on each ot them his brand.",8 The owner here stand. 
tor that .ection ot consciousne.s whioh recognizes and pronounoes, 
on the identity; the brand, tor those oharacteristics which are 
limilar and which cause the consciousness to recognize the 
thoughts as belonging to it. The obvious diftioulty in thia ex-
planation is to explain the owner. Oommon senae oall. tor a real 
owner, a spiritual entity ot some kind. It maintains that it i. 
the real relation to this entity which make. the individual 
thoughts atick together, and that without thia relation to .uch 
a real entity "their actual acoretion into a 'personal consciou.-
ne •• ' would never have taken place. n59 Jaaes peroeived the dit-
ticulty ot having many thing. ru.e without a medium, but he .aid: 
[;r:] n our own acoount the medIum is tully as.igned, the 
herdsman is there, in the shape ot .omething not among 
the things collected, but superior to them all, namely, 
the real, present, onlooking, remembering, Judging 
'thought' or identitying 'section' ot the stream. 50 
57 Ibid., 202. 
58 James, Princi21es ~ PSlchologl, I, 337. 
59 Ibid., 337. 
-
60 Ibid., 337. 
-
But common-sense atill is not satistied. It claim.s that "unless 
the Thought have a substant1al identity w1th a former owner--not 
a mere cont1nu1ty or a semblance, as 1n our account,"6l the unitT 
or 1dent1tT ot personal consc10usness 18 not explained. Now 
James sav that this claim led direotly to e1ther the "soul 
theory" of metaphYSics, or the "transoendental Ego" ot Kant, and 
he did not want to admit either ot these solut10ns. ae theretore 
propo.ed another explanat10n whereby the "t1tle" ot the collec-
tIve selt 1. passed trom one thought to another 1n 80me analo-
gous way. 
It is a patent taot ot consciousness that a transmis-
sion like this actually oocurs. Each pulse ot cognitive 
consciousness, eaoh thought, d1e. awaf and is replaced 
br another., The other, 8lI.Ong the thing. 1t know., know. 
1ta own predecessor, and tinding 1t 'warm,' in the waf 
ve have de.oribed, greets 1t, sa7ingl tThou art mine, 
and part ot the same selt with me. t Each later thought, 
knowing and includIng thus the thoughts whioh went 
betore, is the final receptaole--and approprlati~g them 
is the tinal owner--ot all they oontain and own. 02 
James teels that this explanation answers satistaotor1ly, without 
reoourse to an Ego or to a soul, the problem ot personal iden-
t1ty, and prov1des, moreover, the solution on the phenomenal 
level. Thus, instead ot an Eso or a soul, W8 have a "section" ot 
the stream ot oonsciousness stand1ng as representative ot the 
ent1re past stream, to be enveloped, in turn, by a subsequent 
61 Ib1d., 
-. 
.338. 
62 Ib1d. , 
-
.339. 
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"section" of the SIJIle atream. The only d.1fficulty whioh remains 
to be anawered is Just how one aeotion of the stream o£ thought 
-
appropriates ita predecessors. James both expresses this diffi-
culty and answers it in the follOwing passaget 
A thing cannot appropriate itself; it !! itself; and 
still less can it disown itselt •. There must be an agent 
ot the appropriating and disowning; but that agent ve 
have already named. It is the Thought to whom the var1-
our 'constituents' are known. That Thought is a vehicle 
ot choice as well as ot cogn1tion; and among the 
choices it make a are theae appropriationa, or repudi-
ations, ot lts 'own •• 63 
li1s oonclusion ia, then, that "the paaaing thought aeeu to be 
the thinker; and though there mal be another non-phenomenal 
thinker behind that, ao far we do not seem to need him to expre.s 
the tacta. n64 This position having been formulated, James takes 
up and denies in turn the nspiritualiat" theor7, which holds that 
the soul is a substantial, immater1al agent of psychic activity; 
the associationist theorY', which holda that the "soul" i. on17 a 
.erie. of separate but related ideas} and the transcendentalist 
theon of Kant, which holds that the loul 11 an unknown X, tuno-
-
tioning above the pure Ego, but unknown b7 it. 
Thus by a atrictly empirical approach, James has ana-
lyzed the proceS8 of thinking. Hi8 positlon ma7 be stated 
briefly as the following, The stream ot thought, a personal, 
63 Ib1d., 340. 
-
64 Ibid., 342. 
-
)0 
active •• eleotive process, whioh reduce. the "undistinguishable, 
swarming oontinuum" to an orderly, intelligible world, flows on 
without interruption in eaoh ot us. The pas.ing thought is the 
only thinker, appropriating to itself the thoughts which bave 
gone betore, and being in turn appropriated by it. successor. 
We have seen in this ohapter oertain manifestations ot 
Jame.'s artistic temperament, as, for example, his imaginative 
desoriptions of the "stream ot thought" and the "herd of oattle." 
We have seen the obvious influenoe of Darwin in the entire 
development of the "stream of thought" and in the analysis ot its 
oharaoteristics. The background influence of Descart.s shows 
it.elf in Jam.s's treatment ot the "spiritualist" position ot the 
soul. ae considers it as it it were a separate and separable 
entity, inaocessible to the empirical psychologist, and theretore 
something to be discarded aa unneoessary for an explanation ot 
the observable tacts. James's empirioal analysis ot the phe-
nomenon ot thought, which resulted in the theory ot the "stream 
ot thought," was, aooording to Townsend, his major contribution 
to the field, tor "he correoted the atomism of assooiationist 
psychology and discovered continuities in the mental lite which 
BUme, with his more rigorous logic, had been unable to observe."~ 
This theory ot the "stream of thought," however, was based on a 
6S B. G. Townsend, Philosophioal Ideas in the United 
State., }few York, 1934, 141. - -
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dualiam of knower and thing known aa two separate and distinct 
entities. In the next chapter we ahall a •• the conflict which 
aroae between this dualism of the PSlchologz and the moniaM of 
Jameata philosophic inv.stigations. 
OHAPTER III 
THE CON]i'LIOT BETWEEN PSYOHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPH!' 
As we saw in the preceding chapter, James protessed an 
explicit dualism ot knower and thing known in hi. PSlchology, but 
hi. allegiance was divided between this "provisional doctrine"l 
and the philosophy which he held in reserve. Aa Perrl sallt 
While hil mind had become clear as to the interrelations 
ot the partl ot the stream ot consciousness--thelr 
transitional and tunctional oontinuitl--he was sreatlJ 
troubled by the Question of the relation ot oonsciousness 
to the external world which it purport. to know. In order 
to get on with his PSlchology, therefore, he made up his 
mind to shelve thil question bl assumina the position ot 
dualism. l 
Bowever, in spite of his intention to set this epiatemological 
question aaide, it definitell intluenced his thinking, and "the 
protession ot dualiam, combined with an inner tendencl to moniam, 
led to contusion and ambiguity"3 in manl parts at the Paychologz. 
Added difficulties aroae from Jam8s's prolonged battles with 
II, 72. 
1 Perry, ~ Thought ~ Character £! William James, 
2 Ibid., 39. 
-
.3 Ibid., 73. 
-
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ideali.m, both Serkeleyan and Kantian. It 1. the opinion of 
Perry that "on the first issue, concerning empirioal or 
Berkeleyan ideallam, James waa long of a dlvided mind, and it was 
only towards the end of hi. career that he could pronounoe une-
quivocally in favor of realism."4 Paradoxicallz enough, it waa 
during the writing ot hi. PSlohololl' when he aeems mo.t clearly 
to profe •• extra-mental reality, that Jame. was strongly influ-
enced bl idealll.,s and later, during the development of hi. 
philolophy ot Radical Empirloi.m, when hi. theory ot "pure experi 
enee- oau.ed manl accuaationa ot ideall.m and even ot aolip.ism, 
that Jame. became an outapoken advocate of realism.6 
Indicatlona of hia moni.tic tendencles appeared early 
in the laycholo81' though they were not clarified or tully 
developed until Jame. began to work out alstematically hi. 
philo.ophic ideas later in his career. Bis note. during the 
earll period7 ahow that he was attracted by Spenoer's tormula, 
accordlng to which biological and palchological 
4 Ibid., I, 573. .' .,,' 
- .; /;). r~J--< 
5 Perry,!!!!. Tho':1:Et and Oharacter !!!. William Jameti, -
Briefer Version, 273. 
6 James, Essays ~ Radical Empiricism, Bew York, 237. 
7 Parrl, The Thought and Character of William Jam.s, 
I, 580. Parry has done-a slgn~ iirvlce tor eviFy student or 
Jame. by his editing and publishing ot James's private not •• in 
hi. comprehensive two-volume work on Jam.a. The •• note. are verl 
helpful in clarifying certaln obscurities in Jame.'. published 
wo:rks. 
in esaenoe" both being an ad.Ju.t.ent ot "Inner" to "outer" rela-
tlons. Atter explaining Spenoer'a text, Jame. aays. 
!he a7Othetl0 construotion ot objeotivity and aubJeo-
tivity may mean that even in the most rudimentary sensa-
tion there i. a dim duality, a duplex aspeot, what one 
may oall an timmanent' slde (which oonstitute. the taot 
that it is aotually a aenaation), and a transoendent 
81de (which ia the reterenoe to aomething aa known 
through aenaation). The senaation in this view becomes 
the torm ot knowledge, the reterence becomes its matter 
or oontent, and the torm and the matter are inaeparable. 
Even the min1mwa ot teeling has them. • • • I 1I171elt 
1ncline more and more to 80.e view as this • • .H 
Though this obaervation was written at the time when Jamea was 
working on the pSZ0holoil. It oonstltutes a ditterent approach 
and theretore 18 not immediately evident in that work. However, 
it we take a pas8age trom the palcholoil and tollow Jamea'a line 
of reaaoning olosely. we shall .ee ev1denoe ot the trend toward 
monism. 
In hi. dlsoussion ot the consoiousness ot .elt, James 
says, "The tselt ot .elves,. when oaretully examined. Is tound to 
conslat mainly ot the collection ot these peculiar motlons In the 
head, or between the head and the throat."9 It a generalization 
ot this personal observatlon can be made, then "It would tollow 
that our entire teeling ot spiritual activity, or what commonly 
8 Ibid., $'81. 
-
9 Jame., Prinoiples ot Pszchologz. I, 3011 ct. Ea.ala 
1n Radical Empiricism. 31. tor &-later and more complete analysIa 
or thIa n.elr 01 selvea." 
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pas.e. bl that name, is realll a teeling ot bodill activities 
whose exact nature is bl most men overlooked."10 The oonclusion 
to be drawn trom this hypothes1s 1s that "the existence ot this 
thinker would be given to us rather as a logical postulate than 
as that direct inner peroeption ot spiritual act1v1tl which we 
naturalll believe ourselves to have."ll After comparing the 
po.tulated thinker behind .pir1tual activity to postulated matter 
behind phlsical activitl, Jame. continues, "Between the postu-
lated matter and the postulated thinker, the sheet ot phenomena 
would then swing, some ot them (the frealities') pertain1ng more 
to matter, others (the fictions, opinions, and errors) pertaining 
more to the thinker. n12 Here we see the beginning of the theorl 
ot "pure experience," the neutral monism ot Jamesta later philo-
aophl. This "pure experience" was later described as neither 
phYSical nor mental, but ju.t "that." It remained tor the 
knower to make the distinction, to lead awal trom the "pure ex-
perience" e1ther in the direction of the knower, or in the direc-
tion ot the realitl known. Perrl observes, 
When James spoke ot having a moni.tic philosophl in 
10 James, principle. 2! PSlchologz, I, )02. 
11 Ibid., 304. 
-
12 Ibid., 304. 
-
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. 
re.erve1) he m.ant to reter to the phenomenall.. Juat 
.et torth, or to so.e further development ot It. Such 
a development waa clearly Indicated, the phenomenon or 
frepre.entation' ot Benouvier oon.trued a. both .ub-ject and object, was to become the ph.nomenon ot 'pure 
experl.nce' con.trued as n.lther.14 
Further Indications ot the monis. ot "pure .xperience" are round 
el •• where In the P.ychololl. In on. place Jame •• &YI, "Experi-
enc., trom the very atart, pre.entl UI with concreted object., 
vaguely continuou. wIth the relt ot the world Which .nvelops thea 
in spac. and time, and potentIally divisible into inward ele.enta 
and parts."l, Again, in dl.cus.lns perception, Jam ••• aY8. "OUr 
earlie.t thought. are almost exclusively •• nsational. T.bey 
m.rely give us a .et ot that., or Itl, ot subjects or disoourse, 
-
with thelr relation. not brought out."16 In still another place, 
the analy.i. ot an entirely new •• nl.tion lugge.tl • latent ten-
denoy to monis.: 
I. it a .ubjeotive quality ot t.ellng, or an obJeotive 
quality telt? You do not even alk the que.tion at thil 
point. It il limply that taate. But it • dootor hearl 
you d •• cribe It, and •• y'l ilil now you know what heart-
burn ii,' then it becom •• a qualIty already exIstent 
extra _m .... n_t .... m ..... ~ which you in turn have come upon and 
13 IbId. , 220. 
-
I, 584. 14 
Perry, ~ Thought !2! Character ~ William James, 
15 Jame., prlnoi21e• !! psychology, I, 487. 
16 Ibid. , II, 3. 
-
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learned. The rirat apacea, time., things, qualities, 
experienced by the child probably appear, 11ke the 
first heartburn, in this absolute way, a •• imple beings, 
neither in nor out of thought. l 7 
These sections of the PSlcholoSI seem to indicate the beginning 
of the later theory of "pure experience" with its neutral enti-
ties, inditrerent to the distinction between subJeotive and ob-
jective. James, however, had not elaborated this theory at the 
time of the writing ot the Psychology, and conaequentlz "he did 
not yet teel that it afrorded a seoure toundation tor his psyobo-
logical superstructure. n18 
The first positive step at this time toward a monistic 
philo.Ophl, and one whioh waa entirely in harmony with the oon-
tent and method or approach 1n the Psycholoil, was the rejection 
ot the soul. 
It ia at all eventa needless tor expressing the aotual 
.ubjective phenomena ot oonaoiou.ne •• as they appear. 
w. have formulated the. all without its aid, by the 
supposition at a stream or thought., eaoh substantially 
difterent tram the rest, but cognitive at the rest and 
'appropriative' of eaoh other's content •• 19 
Baving thus disposed ot the first elemer-t ot Descartes' !!! cogi-
tans, James began to undermine the second element, namely, con-
........... 
sciousnes.. In his aooount ot the nature ot "selt" and our oon-
11 Ibid., I, 272 • 
.......... 
II, 73. 
19 James, Prinoiple. 2! psychology, I, 344. 
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sciousnes. of "selt," he describea the emplrical "me," all that 
la lett ot the "subject" In hia prote.sedly duallstlc p.ycholoiY, 
in objeotive terms, "The worda •• , then, and !!!!, so tar aa the7 
arou.e t.ellng and oonnote emotlonal worth, are objeotive deslg-
nationa, meaning all the thing. whioh have the power to produoe 
In a .tream ot oonsolou.ne •• exoitement ot a oertain peouliar 
.ort."20 The tollowing analy.18 ot personal IdentIt,. .ubstan-
tiate. thia diminution ot the "subject": 
The aense ot our own personal Identity, then, ls exaotly 
llke anyone ot our other peroeptlons ot sameneas amoni 
pheno.ena. It 18 a oonolusion grounded elther on the 
rese.blano. In a tundaaental respeot, or on the oonti-
nulty betore the mind, ot the phenomena oompared. 21 
It was not, however, untl1 man,. ,.ears later that James telt .ut-
tioiently sure ot hia theory to make expllo1t and outrlght his 
reJeotion ot "con.ciouana.a": 
lOr twent,. years paat I have mistrusted I conaoiou.ness , 
as an entlty; tor aeven or elght years past 1 have sug-
gested It. non-exi.tanoe to my stUdent., and tried to 
give them its pragmatl0 equlvalent in realities of ex-
perience. It .ee" to me that the hour is rlpa tor It 
to be openly and unlveraall,. dlacardad. 22 
This rejectlon ot "conac10uanea." might .eem absurd at tirst 
glance, tor no one oan den7 that thoughts exiat. Jame. claritie. 
20; Ibid., .319. 
-
21 Ibid., )41. 
-
22 Jame., E.aa,.s 1n Radical Empiriol •• , .3. 
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hia atatement by aaying, "I •• an only to deny that the word 
stands tor an ontity, but to inai8t m08t emphatioally that it 
doea atand tor a tunotion."23 !hat tunction ia knowing. It i8 
to explain thi. tunction that we have been acouatomed to use the 
ter.m "conaciousness," that element ot the !!! cogitana which per-
torma the function ot knowing. Row what we call "consciouane8s" 
i8 not 8ueh an entity. but la a oapacity or quality which parts 
ot experienoe have ot being known. fhe attributes ot subject and 
object, ot thought and thing, are .erely practical distinction8 
arising trom their fUnction, not trom their being.~ 
!here i8 ••• no aboriginal stuft or quality ot being, 
contrasted with that ot which material object8 are made, 
out ot which our thought8 ot them are made; but there 
1a a tunction 1n experience which thoughta perform, and 
tor the pertormance ot which thi8 q~a11ty ot being i. 
invoked. That function i8 knowing.25 
Row that Jamea haa rejected the traditional explanation ot the 
process of knowing, he teela hi .. elf obliged to provide in 80me 
way tor that tunction'8 being carried on. It i8 tor thi8 rea80n 
that he prop088. hi. moniam ot "pure experience": 
H1 the.is i. that it we start with the aupposition that 
there 1. only one primal stutf or material in the world, 
a .tutt of whioh everything ia compo.ed, and it we call 
23 Ibid., 3. 
-
24 Ibid., 232. 
-
25 Ibid., 4.. 
-
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that stuff 'pure experIence,' then knowIng oan easily 
be explained as a particular .ort ot relation toward. 
one another Into which portions at pure experience may 
enter. The relation it.elf II a part ot pure experienoe; 
one at It •• terma' become. the .ubJect or bearer ot the 
knowledge, the knower; the other beco.e. the objeot 
known. 26 
Bence experience in the instant field of the present i8 only po-
tentIally either subjective or objective. Obviously these are 
but functional attributes, and are numerically the same In the 
state at pure exporience. 27 
It 1. by •• ans of this hypothesis that James intend. to 
.olve the fundamental problem ot epistemology: how is It possIble 
tor one thing to be in two place. simultaneously? All prevIous 
atte.pta at aolving thla problem had been based on a dualism at 
knower and thing known aa the minimum possible In any act ot 008-
nitlon. On the contrary, Jame •• aya, "Experience ••• haa no 
such inner duplicity. and the .eparation at it into consciousne.s 
and content come., not by way ot lubtraotion, but b7 way ot ad-
dltion."28 In order to bring out his point more olearly, he u.e~ 
a mathematical anal0871 
The puzzle ot how the one identical room can be In two 
place. i8 at bottom just the puzzle ot how one identical 
point can be on two line •• It oan, it it be situated at 
26 IbId., 4 • 
........... 
27 IbId., 23 • 
............ 
28 IbId., 9 • 
........... 
their inter.ection; and .iDdlarly, it the 'pure experi-
ence' ot the room were ot a place ot inter.ection ot 
two processe., which connected It with ditterent groups 
ot associates respectively, it could be counted twice 
over, a. belonging to either group, and spoken ot loo.e-
ly as existing in two places, although it would remain 
all the time a numerically sIngle th1ng. 29 
In spite ot the explanation provided by this analogy, the que.-
tion remains: Just what Is thi. "pure experience." lam •• says, 
"The instant tleld of the pre.ent ls at all times what I call the 
'pure' experience.~30 And again, "[I]t il plain, unqualified 
actuality, or existence, a slmple that.")l Such a de.cription, 
........... 
however, hardly satisfle. the mind, and so lame. attempts to be 
more specltic: 
r~here is no general sturt ot which experience at 
large is made. !here are as many stutts a. there are 
'natures' in the things experienced •••• Experience 
is only a collective name tor all these sensible 
naturel, and lave tor time and Ipace (and, it you like, 
tor 'being') there appears no univerlal element ot 
which all things are made.)2 
.eedless to say, this explanation led to a great deal ot mi.un-
derltanding, partly because ot the ditficulty inherent in such a 
novel concept, and partly because James never adequately distin-
guished between this "pure" experience and subjeotive or con-
~ 
)0 
31 
32 
Ibid., 
........... 
IbId., 
........... 
Ibid., 
........... 
Ibld., 
............ 
4. 
23. 
23. 
26. 
Bcioua experience. Oonsequently, many who followed the deyelop-
ment of this theory aooused James of monistic idealis., and 80me 
even of solipsism.33 Oharles Sanders Peiroe, an associate of 
James at Barvard, and a reputable philosopher in h1s own r1ght, 
expressed his opinion of the theory thus: 
What you oall 'pure experienoe' 18 not experienoe at all, 
and oertainly ought to have a name •••• It is vital 
tor aoience that he who introduoes a new oonoeption 
ahould be held to have a duty imposed upon him to invent 
a sutfioiently diaagreeable aeriea of words to express 
It.34 
James, however, merely reiterated his explanation, and oont1nued 
to hold fast to the theorr. It was for him the only solution to 
the troublesome ep1~t.mological problem because in his theorr 
alone he saw a plausible explanation of the funotion of knowing. 
As he says: 
The tirst great pitfall from which such a radioal atand-
ing by experienoe will save us is an art1ficial concep-
tion of the relations b.tween knower and known. Through-
out the hi.tory or philosophy tSe subject and its object 
have been treated aa absolutely discontinuous entitie.; 
and thereupon the presence ot the latter to the former, 
or the 'apprehenSion' by the tormer of the latter, haa 
asaumed a paradoxical charaoter which all sorts ot 
theories had to be invented to overcome.3$ 
Jame. telt that hi. theory, tounded a. it was on the empirical 
data of hi8 atudie. in paychology, provided at least aa good an 
33 Ibid. , 
-
234. 
34 Perry, !!!! Thought and Charaoter of William James, 
II, 388. - -
35 Jame., Ea.a a in Radioal irioism" 52. 
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explanation for the funotion ot knowing as had been provided by 
any ot the theories in the past, even though "pure experienoe" 
was admittedly rather elusive under close analysi., and oontained 
diffioulties which kept 1ta author occupied with lengthy explana-
tion •• 
The f1rst diff1culty crew out ot the very not10n of 
"pure experienoe." We have ~een how Jaae. handled thiS, and also 
the weakne.s.s whioh he attempted In valn to explaln away. In a 
later e.say.36 he made another attempt to explain in detall the 
nature of "pure experience." It was here that he admitted that 
"only new-born babe., or men In .emi-coma trom sleep, drug., 111-
nesse., or blows, may be as.umed to have an experlenoe pure in 
the literal sense of a that whioh is not yet any definite what."JI' 
-
Since this explanation oarries the theory into the broader oontext 
of Radioal Emp1rici.M, it will be taken up in relation to the 
whole philosophio structure in the next ohapter. 
Another objection leveled was against the tenet of 
"pure experienoe" that thought and thing are numerically the same, 
that subJeotivity and objeotivity are only functional attribute., 
realized only when the experienoe i8 "taken," i.e., "considered 
along with its two differing contexts respeotlvely, by a new 
.36 
.37 
Ibld., 92, "The Thing and Its Relatlons." 
-
Ibld., 94 • 
-
44 
retro.pective experience, ot which that whole past complication 
now forma the fresh content."l8 It thls is '0, the obJectlon 
runl, "how come. it that it. attrIbute •• hould dIffer .0 funda-
mentally In the two takIngs' A. thing, the experience 1s ex-
tended. as thought, it occupies no space or place."39 Jame. 
begin. hi. retutation of this objection by the question, "Are 
thought and thing as heterogeneous as is commonly laid,"40 Then 
he describe. the ele.ents whioh they have In common, such .a 
time, parts, .impliclty, or oomplexlty. Both can be d.scribed. 
Both are extended, though mental extension is relatlve to the 
context.41 ae substantiate. thil by reterence to the psycho-
10glcal data on peroeption, and .ays that "psychology books are 
full ot faota that make for the easentlal homogeneity of thought 
wi th thing. "42 !he only sure wa., whioh we have of distingui.hing 
the two are b., their oon.equence'l real objeot. alwaYI have oon-
lequenc.s, whereal mental objects do not.43 
38 Ibid. , 
-
27. 
39 Ibid. , 
-
27. 
40 Ibid. , 28. 
-
41 !!?!!!. , )0. 
42 ~., 29. 
43 Ibid. , 33. 
-
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One tinal objection which warrant. .eriou. oonsidera-
tion i. that ot two or IIlore mind. knowing one thing. Bow can a 
unit ot "pure experienc." ent.r into and tigure in two div.r •• 
• tr.ams ot consciou.n ••• without turning it.elt into the two 
unit. ot a duali.tic P'7chologJ' Atter examining the que.tion 
caretul17. Jame •• ar" 
There is a wa7J and the tir.t .t.p towards 1t i. to s.e 
mol'. preoi •• 17 how the unit enter. Into elther one ot 
the .tre ... ot con.clousne •• alone. Ju.t what. troa _1.1. 
belng 'pure.' doe. ita b.coming 'consclou.' once .. an~ 
-
In order to bring out hi. solution mol'. clearlr, James take. the 
example ot a pen. The pen In itaelt 1. "pure experience," and 
tigure. in a "con.ciou." lite onl7 Insotar a. it haa been appro-
priated. 
That pen, virtually both objeotlv. and SUbJective. 1. 
at it. own mo.ent actuallr and Intrin.ecallr nelther. 
It hal to be looked back upon and u.ed in order to be 
cla.sed in .ither distinctlv. war.~ it. u.e, so 
called. is in the hands ot the other experlence, while !! .tand8'4ihrOUghout the operatIon, paaslve and 
unchanged. 5 
low it the pen reaaina unchanged when appropriat.d br one stre .. 
ot oon.ciou.n •••• no n.w condItion would have to b •• uppli.d when 
it was appropriated br two or aore .tr.aml ot con.clouln •••• 
-
Th. two actl would int.rt.re n.lther with on. another 
nor wlth the originallr pur. p.n. It would .1.ep undll-
turbed in 1 t. own pa.t, no matter how man7 .uch IUC-
ce •• or. w.nt through their leveral appropriative aot8. 
44 !2!!., 128. 
45 Ibid., 130. 
-
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Bach would know it al '.y' p.rcept, .ach would olass it 
as a 'conacioua' fact.46 
Bence Jamel concludel bl way of anlw.r to the difficulty: 
The paradox of the aam. .xp.rienc. figuring in two oon-
Iciouln.s ••• I •• ml thus no paradox at all. To b. 'oon-
IciouI' meanl not simply to be, but to be report.d, 
known, to have awarenell of one'l being added to that 
b.ing; and thil il just what happens when the appropria-
tive exp.ri.noe supervenes. Th. pen-.xperienoe in its 
original imm.diacy il not aware of it •• lf, it simply iI, 
and the a.cona experi.nc8418 required for what we oalr-
awareness of it to occur. 7 
In concluaion, then, we have a.en 1n th1a ohapter the 
reourr.noe ot Jamea'a r.pr •••• d philosophio ideas in the text ot 
h11 P'lchology, and the d.velopment of the p.ychological theorle. 
awal trom the traditional dualllm of mind-matter to a moni.tic 
theory of pure experienoe. "Pure experienoe," as oonlldered in 
this ohapter, was the outgrowth ot a subconscioul application of 
the prinoiples of Radical Empirioi8m to the field of PSlchology, 
lubconsciou., it •• em8, becau •• Jam •• had expressly set aside hil 
philolophic .peoulationl in order to complete his P'lchologz. 
'everih.l •• s, hil .limination of the soul and hia diminution ot 
the "aelt" in thia work definitell paved the val for the e.tab-
li.hm.nt of the th.orl of pur. experi.noe. ~s th.orl wa. at 
the a~. tim. J .... t. lolution to the epiltemological problem and 
a fundamental principl. in his philolophy of Radical Empiricilm. 
46 Ibid., 131. 
-
47 Ibid., 132. 
-
CHAPTER IV 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF RADICAL EMPIRICISM 
Toward the end ot hi. lite, Jame. saw the need tor aome 
systematic exposition ot hia tinal philo.ophic po.ition. Be 
besan to oollect articlea whioh had been published .arlier and to 
group th.m under the title "Essays in Radical Empirioi •• ,"l but 
he died betore thi. proJect was completely carried out. It va. 
lett to Ralph Barton Perry to bring together in one volume a 
•• riea ot .asay. which treat at Jame.ts tinal position. 
When ve .peak ot the "philo.ophy" ot William James, we 
do not reter to a clo.ed .y.tem at ldeaa, deduced trom one or 
more tundamental princlple. and atandins as one integrated vhole. 
As Perry vell .ay.z "The philo.ophy at William J .... cannot be 
torced within the bounds ot any orderly syate.. Be had no lnt.r-
eat in intell.ctual architeotur., he was an .xplor.r, and not a 
.urveyor or map mak.r."2 Radical Empiric1sm, theretore, should 
1 J .... , Easaya in Radical Empirioia., pr.fao. by 
Ralph Barton Perry, 111. --
I, 449. 2 Perry, l2! Thoulht !!! Oharaoter ~ William Jam.a, 
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~e called a philolophic attitude or approach rather than a ololed 
'Yltem or derinite doctrine, and it 1a characteristic ot allot 
Jamel'a writingl, though it waa enunciated aa luoh only toward 
the close ot his career. 
A.lthough trace. or Radical Emp1ricism are, as we have 
leen, tound in the PllChololl, the tirst explioit mention ot thl. 
approach is tound in !he Will to Believe, where lame. aay., 
- - ...... ......,;..--' 
It hal .eemed to me that these addresses might now be 
worthy ot collection in a volume, as they Ihed explana-
tory light upon eaoh other, and taken together express 
a tolerably detinite philosophio attitude in a very un-
technical way_ 
Were I obliged to give a abort name to the attitude 
in question, I Ihould call it that ot radical kriliri-
Cil., 1n Ipite ot the tact that such brier nro el are 
nowhere more misleading than in philosophy_ I say 'e.-
piricis.,' becau.e it i8 oontented to regard itl most 
assured conolulionl ooncerning matter. ot tact .s hy-
pothe.e. liable to moditioation in the oourse ot tuture 
experienoe, and I .ay 'radical,' becau.e it treat. the 
doctrine ot ~ni.m ltlelt as an hypothesis, and, unlike 
80 muoh ot the halfway empiricism that 11 current under 
the name ot positivilm or agno.tici.m or scientitic 
naturalism, it doe. not dogmatically atfirm monism as 
something with which all experience has got to square.) 
A tew years later, in a letter to the Italian translator ot hil 
Psychology, James mentioned thil "philosophic attitud." al hil 
predOminant intere.t. 
I am interested in a metaphysical IYlte. ('Radical Ea-
piricilm') which has been torming itselt within me, more 
intere.ted, in taot, than I have ever been in anything 
els., but 1t ls very ditticult to get it into Ihape tor 
3 Jamel, The Will to Believe, Xew York, 1931, pretace, 
vii; tirst edition pUDIiiEi! In 1891. 
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any conneoted exposition; and, though it contalns v.ry 
practical elements, I tind It almost imp08sible to put 
it into popular torm.4 
At the time ot the writing ot this letter, F.bruary, 1905, Jam •• 
had alr.ady publi.hed two ot the mo.t important article. on hi. 
"metaphy.ical sy.tem," namely, "Doe. Con.ciou.ne.s Exi.t?"S and 
"A World ot Pure Experlence. n6 In the latter h •• tatea, 
I give the name ot 'radical empirioism' to my W.lten-
8chauunf. Empiricis. i. known as the oppo.ite or 
ratlona i.m. Rationali.m tend. to empha.ize univer.als 
and to make whole. prior to parts in the order ot 
logic a. well aa in that o~ being. Empirioi.m, on the 
contrary, lay. the explanatory .treas upon the part, 
the element, the individual, and treat. the whole a. a 
coll.ction and the univer.al a. an abstraotion.7 
II, 381. 
4 Perry, ~ !hought !2! Character 2! William Jam.a, 
5 Journal ot PhilO.O~, pszcholoil and Soientitio 
M.thod., I" S.ptem.b.r", 19b4, o. 18. -
6 Ibid., September 29, 1904, .0. 20. 
-
7 James, E.sa,s 1n Radical Em.,irici.m, 41, Perry give. 
a good analy.1. ot empir ciii In £he tol owIng, "Empiricism i. 
tundamentally the doctrine according to which the truth ot know-
ledge d.pends 1n the laat analy.i. on the cont1ng.nt exi.tenc. ot 
that which 1. claim.d to be known. On. may think ever ao clearly 
and ever so nec.s.arily--that in it •• lt prove. nothing. There 
remalns the crucial .videnc., which i. the teatimony ot eye-wit-
n ••••• who are th.m.elve. in po ••••• lon ot the ultimate .vid.nce, 
which i. the t •• timony ot the 'tact.' thems.lv.a. Thu., tor 
.xampl., I judge that crow. are blaok. According to the e.pirical 
th.ory, It suttice., in ord.r tbat this judgm.nt .hall b. correct, 
that a black crow shall pre.ent it.elt. Whether the blackn ••• ot 
crow. i. 10glcally nec •• sary ••• is ot .econdary Importance: 
according to empirici.m, the appearance ot one or more black 
crows cuts .hort the argument and definitely s.ttl •• the matter." 
Perry, !2! Thousht ~ Character 2! William Jame., I, 452. 
so 
In this artiole James explains more fully what he means by the 
qualitying adjective "radical." The older British empirioists--
Looke, Serkeley, and HUme--had tr1ed to analyze knowledge in 
terms ot simple sensations and then to reoonstruot it out ot 
the.e components. By thu •• tressing the disjunotive aspect of 
experienoe aad neglecting the conjunctive, they were torced to 
supply some artitioial conneotive to explain the relations 
between any two sensations. The.e "oonneotives n were later 
attacked by the 1dea11st critics ot empiricis., and it was pre-
ci.ely because ot their evident weaknes. that the idealists, or 
rationalilts as Jamel otten called them, resorted to such trans-
empirical agentl as substances, soul., and intellectual cata-
gorie •• 8 Bow James maintained that it the.e empiricists had 
taken everlthins in experienoe, conjunctions as well as disjunc-
tion., there would have been no need for such artificial connec-
tives.9 Theretore he laid great stre •• on the pre.enoe ot rela-
tion. in experience, and on the baais of the.e relations, a. we 
shall see later in an anallsis of the basic tenets ot Radical Em-
piricis., he developed his own version ot e.pirici ••• 
pOint, 
ot the 
Max B. 
8 James, E.sala in Radical ~iricism, 43. on this 
ct. the introduoiory-..sal to W Ia. James by Paul Henle 
University ot Mlchigan, in Classic American Philosophers, 
Pisch, Ed., New York, 19$1, 121. 
9 James, Essals ~ Radical !!piricis., 44. 
With this general description ot the t.n.ts ot Radioal 
Empirioi.m betore us. it will be helpful at thi. point to di.tin-
sai.h betw.en Jame.'s position and other expr.ssions ot th1s 
"sy.tematie way ot handling que.tiona" which developed .imultane-
ou.ly and were ott.n contu.ed with it. Jame. him.elt. at l.a.t 
in hi. early p.riod ot philo.ophic writ1ng,10 pret.rred to con-
.ider the positions ot Deweyll and Schillerl2 to be ditterent 
trom hi. own mer.ly in approach or in emphasis. A. Perrl .ays: 
In the Pr.tace to Th. Meaning ot Truth Jame. undertook 
to r.pre.ent the vIew. ot Diw.Y; schIller, and hims.lt 
a. compl.m.ntarl rather than contlicting. Schiller'. 
univer.e waa 'p.ychological,t his own 'epi.temological,' 
and a8 tor D.w.l'.--it va. the 'wide.t ot the three,' 
but he retrained trom giving hi. own account ot it. 
complexity.l3 
10 P.rry, The ThOUet and Character ot William Jame., 
II, 531; ct. Jame.'. pretace 0 The Meaning ot ~£h. 
11 Perry. Th. Thought and Character at William James, 
II, 514; Perrl otter.-rn this .ectIOn an Intereiting oompari.on 
between Jame. and Dew.rl "Dewey'S pragmati.m or 'in.trum.ntallsm' 
i. more single-minded than that ot James. He is primarily con-
c.rned with the analrsi. ot the cognitive prooe.s. U. i. not 
.ati.tied with g.neral .tatement. ot it ••••• ntially practical 
character, but undertake. a meticulous examination ot it •• truc-
ture." 
12 Ibid., II, 494; ct. Perrr, PhilO.Ohby at the Reoent 
past, 195: "In England the leading .xponent or t i .ohool I. 
~. s. Schiller. U. calls thl. phllo.oph7 'humani.m,' in order 
to empha.iz. the dependence at knowledge and truth on human 
nature and on the moral and religious demand •• " 
13 Perry, The Thou~t and Character ot William Jame., 
II, 531; Perry .ay. here lhit am;a-wa. InclInea-to term Dewey'. 
approaoh "ontological" but retrain.d b.cau.e ot Dewey'. objection 
to thi. term. 
S2 
Jame. was inclined to minimize the ditterences since his writings 
contained a wide variety ot ideaa which were not logically con-
nected with the matter under discusaion, whereas Devey recognized 
the ditterencea aa more tundamental.14 
Another term whioh haa trequently been uaed in relation 
to Radical EmpiriCism is pragmatiam. In his pretace to the work 
Pragmatism, James distinguished between the two when he .aid: 
"!here i. no logical conneotion between pragmatism, a. I under-
.tand it, and a doctrine which I have recently .et torth as 
'radioal empiricism. t The latter stand. on it. own teet. One 
may entirely rejeot it and still be a pragmatist.nlS He telt, 
however, that "the establishment ot the pragmatist theory ot 
truth is a atep ot tirst-rate importance in making radical empiri 
cism prevail. n16 From this it aeem. that James looked upon prag-
mati.m aa an adjunct to the more complete philosophic approaeh 
ot Radical Empiricism. Thia opinion is conti~ed by his comment 
in another place: "It aeems to me that it radioal empiriCism is 
good tor anything, it ought, with its pragmatic method and ita 
prinCiple ot pure experience, to be able to avoid such tangle., 
14 Ibid., II, 514 • 
............ 
15 Jame., Prai!!ti.m, .ev York, 1912, pretaoe, ix. 
16 James, ~ Meaning 2! Truth, pretaee, xll. 
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or at l.ast to simplity them so.ewhat."17 
Turning now trom our general study ot Radical Empiri-
clsm and its relation to the doctrines ot Dewey and Schiller to • 
more detailed study ot ita basio teneta, we tind the only .x-
plicit atatement by James in the pretac. to ~ M •• ning !! Truth. 
Radlcal Empirioism con.i.t. tirat ot a postulat •• "That the only 
things that shall be d.batabl. among philo.ophers shall b. things 
d.tinable ln t.rm. drawn trom .xperl.nc •• "lB Jam •• admits that 
there ma1 be things ot an unexp.rl.nceabl. nature. but th •• e 
should torm no part ot the material tor philosophio debate. The 
application ot this postulate is evldent in hls treatment of the 
loul In the 'szchololl, where he laYI, "Th. Soul-th.ory ii, then, 
a compl.t •• up.rflulty, .0 tar aa accounting tor the actually 
17 J ..... E •• ay. in Radloal ~iricism, 159. Jame. her • 
• xplain. what he mean. by pragmati.m: "~ pragmatlc method .tart. 
trom the po.tulate tbat there i. no ditterenc. ot truth that 
doesn't make a dltterence ot tact somewhere, and it seeks to 
determine the meaning ot all ditterencel ot opinion by making the 
dilculsion hinge as soon as possible upon some practical or 
particular i.sue." Pragmatism, tak.n in this .en •• , 1. clo.ely 
al11ad to Radical Emplriois •• Bene. Paul S.nle .ay. in hil intro-
duction to William Jame.: "In hls thought, unqueltionably, radi-
cal empiricis. i. an outgrowth ot the pragmatic method •••• " 
Cla.sic Am.rican Philoloph.r., Max B_ Fisch, ed., 121. 
18 Ja. •• , Th. H.anini ot Truth, pr.tace, Xii, thi. 
atat •• ent ot Jame. i.-quot.a by '.rry in his introduction to 
Essals in Radioal EmflriOis. which h •• dited atter Jame.'s death. 
!h. postUlate Is obv ously airected agatnat those whom James 
termed "rationalists," and is meant to insure the fundamentally 
empirlcal character ot his philosophy_ 
verified taotl ot conicioul experience goe •• "19 It i. to be 
noted that he doe. not claim to have e.tablished the non-exis-
tence ot the .oul,20 but only to have .hown that, tor scientific 
purpo.e., it il not neceslary to explain the tactl ot experience. 
For J .. el, theretore, lt is no longer matter tor philosophic dll-
cUllion. It may eXist, or it mar not, but sinoe it cannot be 
defined' In term. drawn trom expertence it will not be conlidered. 
ae clartties this point later vhen he saYI: 
TO be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into itl 
constructionl any element that is not directly experi-
enced, nor exclude trom them any element that i_ direct-
ly experienced. 2l 
When attacked on this point by Mr. Pitkin, an "absolutist" critic, 
James identities thil statement ot hi& as a "methodological pos-
tulate, not a conclusion Iupposed to flow trom the intrinlic ab-
lurdity ot transempirical objecta."22 
19 J .... , Principle. !! Psychologz, I 348. 
20 Ibid., I, 350. 
-
21 James, ESla11 ~ Radical Emeiricilm, 42. 
22 Ibid., 241: argument again.t an article by W. B. 
Pi tkin, ·'A Pro'6Iiii ot Evidence in Radical Empirioism, tf published 
in the Journal ot Philosophl, PIICholOgy and Scientitlc Methods, 
III, lfoveiiiber 2r, 1906, NO.~. I ~ohn.iaer comments on thrl 
pOint: "To clear the decks of non-empirical, tmetaphysical' prob-
lem., he devised pragmatism, it vas intended to facilitate and 
clarify 'philosophical dilcuslion.' Unfortunatel" it dld the op-
posite; it became one more bone of contentton and one more scheme 
tor 'jultlt,ing' unverIfIable taithl." A Bl.tori ot American 
Philo.oehZ, by aerbert W. Schneider, .ew YorK, 940, S,O. 
Radical Empiricism conaiats, secondly, ot a statement 
ot tact: "That the relations between thinga, oonjunotive as well 
as disjunctive, are just .s muoh matters ot direct particular ex-
perienoe .s the things themselves."23 It is in this statement 
that James departs radioally trom traditional empiricism, tor her 
he as.erts that the relations between things, as well as the 
thing. themselve., are immediately perceptible in experience. 
ThIs assertion Is a development ot the opinion tirst expressed in 
the lszcholoSlJ "It there be such things as teeling8 at all, then 
so surely as relationa between objects exist ~ re~ natura, 80 
surely, and more aurely, do teelings exist to which theae rela-
tiona are known."24 He goes on to aay, aa we have already indi-
oated, that not only are there teelings ot oolor and ot cold, but 
........... 
there are alao teelings ot 1£, ot !!!l, ot!l. Language has 
recognized the former, but has oonaiatently refused to reoognize 
the latter, and in this refusal lies the tendenoy to aocentuate 
and isolate more and more the sUbstantive parts ot experience, 
and thus bring about .erious ditfioultie. in relating the.e parts 
which have been i.olated. Jame •• ay.t 
Di]hen a common man analyze. certa1n what. trom out the 
.tream ot experience, he under.tand. their di.tlnotnes. 
23 Jame., ~ Meanl~ 2! Truth, pretace, xii. 
24 James, Prinolple. 2! Psychologl, I, 245. 
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as thus ls01at.d, but this doe. not pr.vent him from 
equiIIY well und.rstanding their oombination with .aoh 
oth.r as originall, .xperienced in the conorete, or 
their confluence W t5 new senslbIi experi.nces in whioh 
they recur as 'the same.' Returning into the .tream ot 
sensible presentation, noun. and adj.ctiv.s, and that. 
and ab.tract what., grow conflu.nt again, and the word 
tis' name. all t5 •••• xp.ri.nc.s ot conjunotlon. 2S 
Finally, the g.neraliz.d conolusion is expressed in the 
tollowing mann.r: "The parts ot .xperienoe hold together trom 
next to next by relations that are them.elve. part. ot .xperieno. 
The dir.etly apprehend.d universe need., in short, no .xtraneous 
trans·empirioal conneotive support, but po ••••••• in it. own 
right a ooncatenated or oontinuou •• tructure."26 What Jam •• 
means here i. that there is no need tor supposing a aubstratum ot 
matter, as Lock. did; nor a subltratum ot .pirit, as B.rk.l.y 
did; nor a "consoiou.ne •• in g.n.ral" with Kant, nor an Abaolute 
Mind with H.g.l and the ab.olut. idealists, nor an Unknowable 
with Spenoer. 27 The only reality i. that which i. immediately 
25 Jame., gs.als !! Radical !!pirielsm, 117. 
26 Jame., The Hean1n8 of Truth, pretace, xli; ot. 
E •• ail in Radical !ilIPrciam, I 7r-"Radleal empirici.m takes con-juno lve-relatlons a £5elr taoe valu., holding them to b. aa 
r.al as the term. united bl them. The world it r.pre.ents aa a 
collection, some parts ot whioh are conjunotively and other. dis-
Junctivell related •••• Suoh determinately various hanging-
together mal be oall.d oonoat.nated union, to distingui.h it trom 
the t thl"ough-and-through' iype ot unlon, 'each in all and all in 
eaoh,' ••• which monistic 81.te .. hold to obtain when thing. 
are taken in their ab.olute reality." 
27 ot. W. K. Wright, B1.torl 2! Modern PhilosophZ, 
.ew York, 1947, 526. 
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experienoeable: ooncrete things and their relations. 
In all this, the contlnuIti8S and the di.continuitles 
are absolutel.,.. co-ordinate matters ot immediate feelillg. 
The conjunction. are a. primordial elements ot 'tact' 
a. are the distInctions and disjunotions. Prepositions, 
copulas, and conjunotiona, '111,' 'isn't,' 'then,' 
'betore,' 'ln,' 'on,' 'belide,' 'oetween,' 'next,' 
'llke,' 'unlike,' lal,' 'but,' tlower out ot the Itream 
of pure experlence, \he Itream ot conoretes or the len· 
lational Itream, al naturall.,.. a8 noun8 and adjectives 
do, and they melt into It again a8 fluldl1 when we 
apply tham to a new portlon ot the Itre.m. 28 
!he direct cor011ar1 ot the generalized conclulion 11 obvioull1 a 
theory ot neutral monism. What Jame. aotuall.,.. did was to expand 
hil p.ychological theor1ot the ".tream of thought," i.e., ot 
continuit1 in oonlciousnels, to a metaph11ioa1 theory of oonti-
nuit7 In being, which he oalled "pure experienoe." As Schneider 
Sa71, "He conceived ot the common world in which we exilt a8 both 
thlngs and thinkers a8 fa world ot pure experience,' a world ot 
experience whioh 1., at the lame time, no one'l experience ex-
olulive11."29 a-ving eliminated both the soul and con.ciousnesl 
trom hil epiatemolol7, Jame. was torced to provide lome explana-
tion tor the function ot knowing. He tound hil explanation, and 
at the lame time the lolutlon to the epi.temological problem, In 
the tn.or7 of "pure experience."30 
II, 388. 
28 Jame., Esaa.,.., ~ Radical Bm2irici.~, 95. 
29 Schneider,! B1ltorz ~ American Phil080phz, 544. 
)0 Perr1, ~ Thougpt ~ Oharaoter !! William Jamea, 
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Jame.'. difficultie., however, were by no means over. 
He describes the.e in a .eriea of lectures which were later pub-
lished under the title A Plurali.tic Univer.e. !he crux ot the 
- .............................. ,;;;;..;.. .;;.;..-......... ----
difficulties lay in what he perceived to be a conflict between a 
tundamental point in his psychology and an equally tundamental 
point in his philosophy. In the ,sychololl he had rejeoted the 
oompounding ot oonsciouanesa, and had maintained that "every 
oomplex mental tact is a .eparate paychic entity, aucceeding upon 
a lot ot other paychic entitie. whioh are erroneously oalled it. 
parts, and superseding the. in funotion, but not literally being 
oomposed ot them."31 In his later theory of "pure experience," 
he waa definitely comadtted to the view that reality and the 
tield ot consoiouanes. were one and the .ame. Thia implied, as 
Perry observes, "that portlona ot the field could be common to 
two or more minds) that the1 oould, In other word., be identical 
parts ot ditterent oonsoiou. wholea."32 James kept a diary ot 
his attempted solutions to thia proble. tor a period of over two 
and a halt year., beginning in the autumn ot 1905. aeterring to 
thia account, he sald, "Sincerely, and patiently as I could, I 
struggled with the proble. tor 1ears, covering hundreds ot sheeta 
31 James, A Pluraliatio Universe, 205. 
-........ ----------- ........ _ ................ 
.32 'erry,!!!!. Thought ~ Oharacter !!. William Jame., 
Brieter Veraion, 331. 
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of paper with notea and memoranda and disouasions with myself 
over the difficulty."33 
The fundamental diffioulty here was the taot that in 
bia PSlchololl James had emphaai.ed the uniqueneas and indiviai-
bility ot the individual stream ot thought. Bach passing 
thought in the tlowing stream appropriated ita predecessors to 
itself and was, in turn, appropriated by its successor. It was 
unique in the sen.e that the exact thought could never be re-
peated in any tuture context. Perry makes the following observa-
tion on this point: 
Jame. could then take this view without prejudioe to the 
existence of a common and permanent world because ot his 
distinction between thoughts and their object., the lat-
ter possesaing the commonness and permanence whioh the 
tormer lacked. But now he had definitell renounced dual-
is., and in place ot thoughts and things there were only 
'experiences.' It these poasesS&! the uniqueness and in-
divisibility ot thoughts, they mu.t lose the commonness 
and permanenoe ot things! and there would remain only 
the desperate alternative ot solipsism. It, on the other 
hand, they possea.ed the commonneas and permanence ot 
things, then they could never enter directly into a 
uniquely individual oonscious experience. HoW to con-
ceive experience so that it could retain both .eta ot 
properties, composing both the immediate and the tran-
sient lite ot the aubject and the Stable world of common 
objects·-that was James's problem.3~ 
In this predicament Jam.s realized that one of his positions had 
33 Jamea,! .P_lu_r_a_l_i_s_t_i_o Universe, 207. 
II, 393. 
34 Perry, ~ Thought ~ Character 2! William Jamea, 
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to be abandoned. 
I saw that I must either torswear that 'psychology with-
out a soul' to which my whole psychological and kantian 
education bad co~tted me, -- I MUst, in short, bring 
back distinct spiritual agents to know the mental states, 
now singly and now in combination, • • • or else I must 
squarely oonress the solution ot the problem impossible, 
and then either give up my intellectuallst 10glc, the 
10glc ot identlty, and adopt some hlgher (or lower) tor.m 
ot rationality, or, flgal17, face the tact that life is 
10glcally irratlonal.35 
Be decided definitely to eliminate the first possible solution, 
the aoceptance ot a soul, because, "like the word 'oause,' the 
word 'soul' is but a theoretic stop-gap it marks a place and 
olaims for it a tuture explanation."36 In the resulting dilemma: 
on the one hand to give up the logic of identity, and on the 
other hand to believe that human experience is fUndamentally ir-
rational, James chose to give up the logic ot identity. The 
reason tor this decision was that "reality, lite, experience, 
concreteness, immediacy, use what word you Will, exceeds our 
logie, overflows and surrounds it."31 The predominant influence 
in making this decision was, as he said, his reading ot Henri 
Bergson. 
It I had not read Bergson, I should probably still be 
blackening endless pages ot paper privately, in the hope 
of making ends meet that were never meant to meet, and 
trying to disoover some mode ot conceiving the behavior 
35 James, A Pluralistic Universe, 208. 
36 Ibid., 210 • 
........... 
37 Ibid., 212. 
........... 
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of reality whioh ahould leave no diaorepanoy between it 
and the aooepted lawa of the logic of identity.l~ 
After reading Bergaon, Jamea aaw clearly that he had fallen into 
the dilemm. in whioh he found himaelf through the intellectualist 
error of considering two abstractions apart from the conorete 
reality in whioh they are found, and thus oonstruoting logioal 
diffioulti.s and oppositions whioh are not found in the r.ality 
concret.ly consider.d. Therefore, Jame. saYI, "I have tinally 
found myself oompelled to give ~ !2! logio, fairly, squarely, 
and irr.vooably,"39 tor "reality obeys a higher logio, or enjoYI 
a higher rationality."40 
Speoifically, Jamel's difficulty was 
the impo •• ibility of understanding how 'your' experienoe 
and 'mine,' whioh taB .uch' are defined a. not con.oiou. 
38 Ibid., 2141 Berg.on's influenoe on James oonsisted 
mainly in his .trong attaoks on "intelleotuali.m." Acoording to 
James, intelleotualist abu.e. began wh.n "Soorat.s and Plato 
taught that what a thing r.ally is, i8 told U8 by its defini-
tion." Ibid., 213. "So fir.t w. identify the things with the oon-
oept, and th.n w. Id.ntity the oonc.pt with a definition, and 
only then, inasmuch a. the thing i. whatever the definition eX-
pre ••.•• , are we aure ot apprehendI'iig the real es.enoe of it, or 
the full truth about it." Ibid., 218. " ••• it is at thi. point 
that the mi.u.e ot oonoepta-srgins through the habit of employing 
them, not to a •• ign properties to things, but to deny the very 
properties with which the thing ••• nsibly present themselve •• 
When the logician oannot extract a oertain property trom a defi-
nition, he i8 t.mpted to deny that the conorete obJ.ct to whioh 
the definition applies can possibly po •• ess that property." Ibid., 
219. -----
.39 Ibid., 212. 
-
40 Ibid., 213. 
-
62 
ot each other, can neverthelels at the lame time be mem-
berl ot a world-experience defined expreilly al having 
all itl partl co-conicioul or known together.41 
Enlightened by Berglontl analYlil, Jamel now law that the problem 
ot how a thing can be its own 'other~ was merely the milule of 
logic, and that, in reality taken concretely, 
.enlational experiencel are their town otherlt ••• both 
internally and externally. Inwardly they are one with 
their partl, and outwardly they pass continuously into 
their next neighborl, 10 that eventl leparated by yearl 
of time in a manta life hang together unbrokenly by the 
intermediary eventa. Their names, to be sure, cut th.m 
into separate conceptual entities, but no cutl ~xisted 
in the continuum in which they originally came.42 
Thus the psychological-metaphYlical problem was settled. There 
still remained, however, the plychological-epistemological prob-
lem over the compounding of the states ot conscioulness. This 
was a ramification ot the tirst problem, but contained its own 
particular difticulties, and its own distinct, though related, 
solution. 
From the notes resulting trom the Bode-Miller contro-
versy we learn that James clearly recognized a contradiction be-
tween his psychology and his philosophy. 
In mr psychology I contended that each field of con-
sciousness il entltatively a unit, and that itl parts 
41 Ibid., 221 • 
........... 
42 Ibid., 285) cf. also 271: "This is Just what we 
mean by the stream's lenlible continuity. No element there cuts 
itself off from any other element, as concepts cut themselves off 
trom concepts." 
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are only difterent oognitive relations whioh it may pos-
sesa with ditterent oontexts. But in my dootrine43 that 
the aame 'pen' may be known by two knowera I aeem to 
imply that an identioal part can help to oonstitute two 
fields. Bode and Miller both piok up the ooniradIotiion. 
The tields are ••• deoomposable into 'parts,' one ot 
whioh, at leaat, ia oommon to both; and my whole tirade 
against toomposition' in the pSloholoSl is belied by my 
own subaequent dootrine.44 
The point at iaaue here is how two tielda oan be units it they 
contain this oommon part. Jamea puzzled over this problem tor 
months betore he auddenly oase upon a po.aible aouroe. He a.ked 
himself, "Hay not my whole trouble be due to the taot that I am 
atill treating what ia really a living and dynamIo aituation by 
logical and atatioal oategoriea?"4S At thia time he waa not yet 
convinoed that h. was involved in such a oontradiction aa would 
necessitate the changing ot either hia paychology or his philo-
lophy, tor he lays, 
The radioal empirioiat deal. with the question tot what 
i. experienoe made?' while the p.ychological retleotor 
deala with that ot 'how it oomes about.' The one takea 
a statio, the other a dynamdo point ot view. They need 
not, therefore, be exaotlr oongruent.46 
Then he took up the "pen-problem" and the "F.chn.r-problem" to-
43 I •••• pur. experience. 
44 Perry, The Thought and Character ot William Jamea. 
II, 1S0. - - -
4S Ibid., 
-
160. 
46 Ibid. , 
-
160. 
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gether, i.e., tIle question ot how the same percept may be an 
aspect ot both physical and mental entities and also how the same 
percept may be an element ot more than one consciousness. To the 
problem of how any term can singly and immediately be both ~ 
and ex another term, he answers that they may be 
...... 
• • • by 'tunctioning' plurally. But functioning means 
having relations; and to solve this problem the relations 
must be external. Yet in the particular cases concerning 
us, it would seem that they could hardly be external it 
my chapters on mipd-stutt and on the stream ot consoious-
ness are correot.47 
Having thus cast some doubt on hi. theories ot psychology, James 
turned to his theory ot "pure experience" and the que.tion ot 
how the same percept, the pen (in his example), may be an aspect 
ot both physioal and mental entities. Atter a careful analysis, 
he says: 
The difficulties oome only when for the seen pen 1s sub-
stituted the tixed logical term 'pen,' and when this 1s 
treated as an absolute or indivisible unit that 'moveth 
altogether it it move at a11 •• 48 
The ditficulties, then, arise from the use at terms, auoh aa 
"pen," abstraotly, apart trom their oontext in the stream at ex-
perience. 
Theae terms cannot possibly have absolute logical values, 
irrelevant to and contradictory ot the experienoes trom 
47 ~., 760. 
48 Ibid., 761 • 
........... 
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which they are derived, and within whioh their oonse-
quences aotually evolve.49 
Here again we see the intluence ot Bergson. By now James began 
to rea11ze that 1n this probl •• too he had rallen into "1ntelleo-
tualis.," and so tells h1mselt: "Don't cleave to your phYSical 
verbal sJmbol abatraotly and literally, but reinterpret it by 
your immediate experiential taot."50 He-examining the double 
aspeot at his problem in the light of this mandate, he saya: 
The 'pen,' as a living real, is the name ot a buaine.s 
oenter, a 'tirm.' It has many customers, my mind, e.g., 
and the physioal world. To oall it the same Een both 
time. would mean that although my mind and t e physioal 
world can and may eventually figure in one and the same 
transaotion, they need not do so • • • and that in 
reapeot ot this particular pen-experienoe neither 
counts in the transaotlon which the other 18 carrylng 
on. I.~ther ia counted by the other, neither i8 for the 
other.51 -
TUrning then to the "Pechner-proble.," he aays: 
Now take a .ental 'state' and trace the pos8ibility of 
its being 'part' ot a wider mental state ot whioh it 
knows nothing. The it here ie both co and ex the same 
thing. Psychologioatry we know thatiiuch tErnss do 
obtain ••• but ho'N' can they?S2 -
-
With this question in mind, James now looka tor other taots in 
whioh the 8ame condition of non-reciprooity in relation ia found, 
49 Ibid. , 761. 
50 Ibid. , 761. 
-
51 Ibid. , 
-
764. 
52 Ibid. , 764. 
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and sa'1lt 
Experience presents examples of it wherever there is 
direction in the relation. Things are not mutuallihlater, 
DIiher, ~etween, etc. aemembrance i8 not mutual. '1 
need 'consciou8ness' be mutual?S3 
Here lie. the core ot the ditficult'1. If consciousness i. not 
mutual, there i. no problem about its being co and ex the same 
- -
thing. James had ba.ed his assumption that consoiousne •• i. 
mutual on the principle which he laid down in his PSlchology that 
"mental facts are as they appear, and cantt 'appear' in two ways 
to themselves."54 Since this principle i8 now found to be un-
-
verified by tact, J .. es i. forced to ohange the position tormerly 
maintained. He now statesl 
DK]ental tacts oan (in spite of my Prinoi21es at PS'1cho-
~) compound i&imaelve., if 'TOU take them concretel'1 
ana-livingl'1, a8 p08sessed ot various functions. They 
can count variously, figure in difterent constellations, 
without cealing to be 'themselves.,55 
In ooncluding this chapter, let us brierly recapitu-
late the development ot James's philosophy. We have seen that 
his Radical EmpiricIsm manifested a thoroughl7 empirical approach. 
He took realit'1 to be just what it .eems to be from experience, 
namel'1, "that di.tributed and strung-along and flowing sort ot 
53 IbId., 765. 
-
158. 
54 ~., 765, cf. Jame., PrinCiples 2! Psychology, I, 
II, 765. 
55 Perr'1, ~ Thousgt ~ Character 2! William James, 
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reality which we finite beings awim in. "56 Such a notion is ob-
viously patterned atter his psyohological dootrine ot the "atream 
ot thought" in ita characteriatica, and ita outatanding teature. 
are thoae whioh ordinary logio reJecta. Jamea tound himaelt in-
volved in logioal oontradictions whioh •• emed inaoluble until, 
under the influence ot Bergson, he reoognized that they were the 
result ot an "intellectualist" miluse of abstraoted ooncepta and 
that the only solution was a return to the original concrete ex-
periences trom which they had been taken. On oloser examination 
ot thea. tacta ot experienoe, Jamel tound that he had been ~s­
taken in hia P8yohologz in the matter ot oompounding ot oon-
sCiousneas, and theretore he modified his psychological position 
to contorm with the more recently disoovered facts. 
56 Jamea, A Pluralistic Univerae, 213. 
- ----..;;.;......;...;.--- ....... ~ ....... ;;.,.;.. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Any attempt to r.duce the writings ot William James to 
a coherent and systematio philosophio structure i. fraught with 
difficultie., tor he had no suoh structure. As Paul Henle sa1s: 
It by a system of philosophy is m.ant fitting everything 
in the universe into its proper logioally demaroat.d 
compartment, James has no s1stem ot philosophy. In this 
sens. h. hated system and his own piQture ot the world 
leave. it full of loose ends and uncompl.t.d proc •••••• l 
.. '---
! As we have .een, Jam.s was by nature, baokground, and .duoation 
an .xplor.r, not a "map maker." With his radioal empiriCist ap-
proaoh he appealed fir.t, last, and always to experienoe, that 
oontinually changing flux which reveal. ever new a.pects and pos-
.ibilitie.. Jam.s him •• lt n.v.r oompl.ted, nor wish.d to oom-
plete, what could properly be oalled a system ot philosophy. Bis 
1d.as are .xpr.ssed for the most part in short articles or pub-
lished series of l.ctur •• , and his m.dium was the popular style 
-'''r·~--
of colloquial English. Though h. was otten oriticized by the 
more .cientitio minded of his coll.agues tor using suoh a styl., 
1 Cla •• ic Amerioan Philo.ophers, ed. by Max H. Fisch; 
introduction £0 WIlliam James by 'aul aenxe, 124. 
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he deemed it necesaary because he was writing largely tor listen-
ers, not tor readers. His tine sense ot judging the capacity ot 
an audience resulted in his attaining "a vogue and intluence 
almost unique among philosophical writers,"2 but it a180 resulted 
in much obscuritr and contusion tor those serioue students ot 
philosophy who were more interested in the thought than in 
attractive expression. James was aware ot this obsourity, and 
otten expressed his intention ot writing a systematic metaphysics 
in technical form tor his colleagues and tor advanoed students. 
The following exoerpt from a letter dated August, 1902, atatea: 
"I now want it posslble to write something serious, systematiO, 
and syllogistio; Itve had enough ot the squashy popular-lecture 
t 1 • "3 a y e ••• In spite of th1s d.sire, however, continual invi-
tations to lecture postponed the project, and though h. heartily 
disliked lecturing, he usually aocepted the invitations. As he 
says in a letter to Schiller atter the request to deliver the 
Bibbert Lectures at Oxford had reached him: 
I accepted because I was ashamed to refuse a protessional 
challenge ot that importance, but I would it hadn't come 
to me. I actually hate lecturing; and this job condemns 
me to publish anotner book written in picturesque and 
popular style when I was settling down to something whose 
manner would be more strengw1ssenschattlich, i.e., oon-
oise, dry, and impersonal.~ tree and easy style in 
II, 364. 
2 Perry, ~ Thought !2! Character £! William James, 
3 Ibid., II, 338. 
-
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Pragmatism has made me ao many enemiea in aoademio and 
peaantlc circles that I hate to go on inoreasing thei, 
number, and want to become tighter instead ot looser.4 
The only articles whioh even approached the desoription ot "dry, 
conoise, and impersonal" were those publiahed atter hi. death in 
the volume Easays ~ Radical Empirioism. In the opinion ot the 
editor ot the work, these essays set torth "systematically and 
within briet compass the doctrine ot 'radical empirioism'"S and 
were designed "not as a collection but rather a. a treatise,"' 
tor "not only were most ot them written consecutively within a 
period ot two years, but they contain numeroua cross-reterenoes."7 
Notwithstanding this oloae relationship, theae eaaay8 leave muoh 
to be de.ired tor an all-inclusive atatement ot James's philo-
aophy. So.e ot the essays, it is true, show a conseoutive 
development ot thought, though othera are merely a restatement or 
a clarittcation ot ideas already expressed. !he essay. expreaa 
the main tenets ot Radioal Empirioism, but they do not give the 
full details ot this approach, nor do they link Radical Empiri-
cism with Jamea's positions in psyohology, pragmati.m, or oos-
11'l010Q.8~-) It i. highly doubtful that Jame. would ever have tormu-
-j 
4 Ibid. , 
-
II, S62. 
S James, Es.ala ~ Radical !meiricia., pretace, vi. 
6 Ibid. , pretaoe, vi. 
-
7 Ibid. , 
-
pretaoe, Ix. 
8 A Pluraliatic uniTerae develop. hi. c08molol7. 
-
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lated a s7stem ot philosoph7 in the strict sens. of the word, 
since both his nature and his approach to philosOph7 militated 
againlt such a Itruoture. His intention seem. to have been to 
make at least a summar7 sketch ot his tinal positions and their 
relations to one another. ae mi&ht have gone further and traced 
the development of his thought over a period ot lome thirt7 
7eara, showing clear17 his cona.cutive positions and their rela-
tion to the oonclusions in the various fielda whioh h. bad inv.a-
tigated. The faot remains, however, that Jaaes accomplished none 
ot this, and the task is lett to his tollowers to formulat., to 
the best ot their abilit7, some picture of his philosOph7 as a 
whole. Sinoe such a picture is essential tor a thorough under-
standins ot James, we will now give a brier sketoh ot the prin-
cipal trends in his works trom the time ot the writing ot the 
pSlcholoil until the publication ot ! Pluralistic Universe. The 
work Essays ~ Radical Em2iricisM, though published posthumousl7, 
was written by James between the years 1884 and 1906. 
The reduotion ot the consecutive positiona ot James to 
an orderly presentation would be a challenge to the author him-
selt, so great is the diversit7 not only in the pOSitions them-
selves but also in the fields in which these poaitiona were 
developed. It we were to look tor a key, tor ~ne word which 
could be us.d to charac,terlze all of these positions, that word 
l '~,. 
would be "experience." James appealed throughout his life to 
, ~ 
experience, d.spite the fact that tor many years he was a con-
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tl~ed Ideallst, for his early training in the tradition ot Locke 
Berkeley, and HUme drew him into the camp ot the Berkeleian 
Ide&11ata.9 While atl11 profesalng this Idea1ism, he took the 
posltion ot duali8m in his P1lchologz.lO We have 8een, however, 
that hi8 philo80phio bent, both before and after the publioation 
ot that work, was toward a kind ot moniam, the seed8 ot whioh are 
found 1n varlous aeotlon8 of the PSlchologl. These early indica-
tiona of monism were, striotly speaking, a "phenomenism," some-
what 8im11ar to that of aenouvier and Mach, though not derived 
trom their position.11 After e1iminatlng both the "soul" and the 
".elf" as entlties in his psychological poaltlon, James was ready 
to deny "consoiousnesa" .a an entity, and thua olear the way for 
the announcement ot his neutral moniam ot "pure experienoe." At 
this tlme he definitely shifted his allegiance trom Berke1elan 
Idealism to realism: 
With transition and prospect thus enthroned In pure ex-
perienoe, it is impo8sible to subsoribe to the idealls. 
of the English sOhool. Radical empiricism has, 1n faot, 
II, 364. 9 Perry, ~ Thouset ~ Charaoter ~ William Jamea, 
10 James, Principles 2! PSloholoil, I, 218. 
11 Perry, The Thought and Character of Wil11am James, 
II, 390: "James t 8 view ot experIenei, then, vaslnot aerIvea trom 
oontemporary p08itivis. any more than from Renouvier. It was in 
agre.ment with a feneral tendency of the t1mes} and it was the 
oulmination of a endenof whioh had governed his own thought trom 
early feara." 
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more a££1nities with natural realism than with the v1ews 
o£ Berkeley or o£ Mlll, and this can be easily shown.12 
This monism o£ "pure experience" now became his dominant interest 
and was characteristic ot much o£ hia later philosophy. We must 
keep in mind, however, that it waa a moniam onll in the epistemo-
logical sense ot a denial ot the dualism ot subject-object in the 
act ot oognition. Furthermore, Jama. held strenuously that it 
was based on realism, not on ideallsm. He consldered the monis-
tic idealists, such as LotZe, Royoe, and Bradley, as his ohie£ 
adversaries. As Perry says! 
He brings the same general charge against them all, name-
ly, that they present philosophy with a talse dilemma 
between utter unity and utter irrelevance. Lotze argues 
that it two things are distinot, they cannot influence 
one another; Royce, that 1£ two things are independent, 
they can never become 1nterdependent, and Bradley, that 
it things are two they cannot be related. The conclusion 
is that since there is lntluence and relationship, implied 
even in bare pluralitj, then distinctness and indepen-
dence must be abandoned: onene.s must be the reality, 
and plurality is the mere appearance. 13 
Bere we see the "inte1lectuali.m" which was so utterly opposed to 
James-s empirioal approach. The unity maintained by the monistic 
idealists was "cosmological" rather than epistemological. Bence 
James could, on the one hand, argue against their position that 
"onen.ss must be the reality" and support pluralism in his cos-
12 Jaa.s, Esaala ~ Radioal Empiricism, 76. 
II, 584. 13 Perry, ~ Thought ~ Character 2! William James, 
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mology, and, on the other hand, ma1ntain the neutral mon1sm ot 
"pure experience." 
J .. e.'. 008mology tind. expreSSion 1n the Blbbert Lec-
tures delivered at Oxford in May ot 1908, and later published 
under the t1t1e A Pluralistic Universe. Perry obaerves, 
There are two oonneot10ns between the metaphysics of 
A Pluralistic Universe and the prat;atis. which preoeded 
Tt. PIpst, tne former i. an appllca Ion ot the lattert 
the pragmatiC .ethod. and standard ot truth are repeat-
edly appl1ed to the proot ot pluralism and the disproot 
ot mon1 ••• Second, the latter is applied to the tormer: 
that 1s, the pragmat1c account of knowledge aftords a 
spec1al case ot the pluralistic metaphysics •••• 
Pragmat1.m does not merely prOVide a method which oan 
be employed 1n metaphysics--it provides a metaphysics 
ot truth whioh is consistent with that general meta-
physios which James advocates, through bringing the en-
tire prooess ot oognition within the tield ot possible 
experlence.14 
In A Pluralistic Univerae James stated the thesis of the lectures 
- --
as "a detense ot the pluralistic against the monistio views."l5 
He says, "Think ot the universe as existing solely in the each-
torm, and you will have on the whole a more reasonable and satia-
faotory ide. ot it than it you 1nsist on the all-torm boing neoes 
sary. "16 This pluralistic view of the univerae is obviously an 
applioation ot Radical Empiricism in general and ot the prinoiple 
14 Ib1d., II, 585. 
-
15 Jam.s, A Plura1ist1c Universe, 44. 
- ---------- --------' 16 Ibid., 44. 
-
75 
. 
ot "pure exp.~lence" In pa~tlcular to the p~ob1em ot the One and 
the Many. Is the world one, O~ 18 It many? Do we have a unl-
-
v.~se or a p1u~lv.~8e? James &nswers this questlon In the tol-
lowing: 
!he world 1. One ju.t so ta~ as Its parts hang togeth.~ 
by any deflnite connexion. It is many just so ta~ as 
any deflnite connezion tal1s to obtain. And tlnally It 
Is growlng mo~e and mo~e unitied by those systema ot 
connezion at leaat which human ene~gy keeps t~am1ng as 
time goes on.17 
Thia last reterence .e.ma to pertaln to the generalized conclu-
aion ot Radical Empi~iCism18 In which we have the many subatan-
tive pa~ts of the experlence-continuum united by directly expe~i­
enced ~.lationa, or transitive parts ot experience. In this con-
tinuum experience p~esents itself as a "theate~ ot simultaneoua 
possibilities," trom whioh the mind, f.eling its way torwa~d like 
an antenna, "carves out" its own intelligible wo~ld f~om "the 
17 James, Prasmatism, 156. 
18 Cf. James, The Meaning ot ~th, preface, xli: "the 
pa~ts ot expe~ience hold togetHer from-next to next by relations 
that are themselvea parts ot experience. The di~ect1y appre-
hended univerae needs, In short, no extraneoua trana-empirical 
connectlve support, but ~ossesse. In it. own right a ooncatenated 
or continuous structure. Cf. also Pe~~7, The Thought and Charac-
ter ot Wllliam Jamea, II, 590: "It Jame. wIined to e.cape the 
PFicircal liplicat10ns ot monis., he wal not les. anxioua to ea-
cape the theo~etl0 diftlculties ot atoDdam, monadiam, duallam, o~ 
any vlew in which unity was excluded in advance. He sought a view 
which ~erm1tted unlty--a. much as theoretiC demands misht reqUire, 
or as he tacta might 11e14, o~ as the ~eliglous consciousne •• 
might crave." 
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jointle.a continuity ot apace and moving clouds ot awarming 
atoma."19 Thia experience-continuum is an active, dynamic, aen-
sibly continuous tlux in which "every individual morsel ot the 
sen.ational atream takes up the adjacent mors.ls by coale.cing 
with them,"20 and "the concrete pulse. ot experience ••• run 
into one another continuously and seem to interpenetrate. What 
in them is relation and what ia matter related 1s hard to dis-
oern."2l In this experience-continuum, a "'mind' or 'personal 
consciousness' ia the na.e tor a serie. ot experiences run to-
gether by certain definite tranaitions, and an objeotive reality 
is a aeries ot aimilar experience. knit by ditterent trans-
itions."22 
19 laaes, Prinoiples !! psycholoSZ, I, 288. 
20 laa •• , A Pluralistic Universe, 271. 
------------ --------
21 Ibid., 282 • 
........... 
22 Jame., Es.ays in Radical Empiricism, 80; ct. ibid., 44. where he discusses thi various type. ot relationsl "RelatIOns 
are ot ditterent degree. ot intimacy. Merely to be 'wIth' one 
another in a universe ot discourse ia the moat external relation 
that term. can have, and seem. to involve nothing whatever aa to 
further consequences. Simultaneity and time-interval come next, 
and then space-adjacency and distance. Atter th .. , similarity and 
ditterence, carrying the possibility ot many interenc.s. Then 
relations ot activity, tying terms into series involving change, 
tendency, resistance, and the oausal order generally. Finally, 
the relation experienoed between terms that torm states ot mind, 
and are immediately conscious ot continuing each other. The or-
ganization ot the Selt as a system ot memories, purposes, striv-
ings, tultilments or disappointments, is incidental to this moat 
intimate ot all relations, the teF.ms ot whioh seem in many cas •• 
to compenetrate and suffUse each other.s being." 
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Juat aa there i8 "no general stuff of which experience at large 
i. made,"23 so too there is no "aboriginal stuff or quality at 
being, oontrasted with that of which material objeots are made, 
out ot which our thoughts of them are made."24 The passing 
thought, "which is the thinker,"2S performs a function in experi-
ence which ia called knOWing. 26 "Consciousness" is not an entity 
but "a kind of external relation, and does not denote a speCial 
stuff o~ way of being."27 
The peoularlty of our experiencea, that they not only 
are, but are known, which thelr 'conscious' quallty Is 
Invokedto explaln, 1. better explained by thelr rela-
tlon.--the.e rel,tlona themselves being experienoes--
to one anothEtr. 2t1 
The desorlption of the passing thought appropriating to it.elt 
Ita predecessors and in turn b.lng appropriated by its suocessora 
ls modlfied later 1n the Easall to a "co-conscious transltlon • • 
• by which one experienoe passe. into another when both belong to 
23 Ibld. , 26. 
-
24 Ibld., 3. 
-
25 James, PrinolEl.s .2!. Psychology, I, 342. 
26 Jam.a, Essals in Radical !!Eirlcism, 4. 
-
27 !!1.!!. , 25. 
28 ~., 25. 
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the same s.lt."29 It will be noted that James slips into the 
"dualistio" te!'m1nology of his PS12hologl, though he is using the 
word "self" here to reter to the oontinuity experienced when "8 
later moment ot my experienoe aucceeda sn earlier one •••• "30 
He goes on to aay: "Continuity here is a definite sort of experi-
enoe, just as definite AI 1s the discontinuity-experience which 
I find it impossible to avoid when I seek to make the transition 
trom an experience ot my own to one of yours."31 In his analysls 
of the "stream ot thought," the first characteristic was that 
each thought is "owned."32 And again, "Thoughts which we actu-
all,. know to exist do not tly about lao •• , but seem to belong to 
some one thinker and not to another."33 !he Similarity between 
the.e two analy •• s i. more obvious if we take into consideration 
the taot that in the PSloholoil James was approaChing the ques-
·t1on on the psychical plane through introspection whereas in the 
later work he was con.idering the problem on the metaphysical 
plane through observation. 
29 Ibid., 47: James s.,.a: "About the taota t.here ia 
no question. My experienoes and your experienoes are 'with' eaoh 
other 1n various ways, but mine pass into mine, and yours pass 
into yours in a way in which yours and mine never pass into one 
another." 
.30 ~ .. 49 • 
.31 Ibid •• 49 • 
32 James, Prinoi21es 2! PSloholo&y, I, 226. 
3.3 Ibid., 
-
330. 
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Not only are an individual's thoughts continuous, but 
a180 "the objective nucleus ot every man's experience, his own 
body"34 is continuous. James continues by stating his opinion 
that "equally continuous as a percept (though we may be inatten-
tive to it) is the material environment of that body, changing by 
gradual transition when the body moves."35 
Thus by denying both the soul and entitative conscious-
ne.s, on the one hand, and by analyzing reality according to the 
"stream or thought," on the other hand, James suoceeded in break-
ing down the mind-body dichotomy into a neutral monism of "pure 
experience." By this theory he provided the American philosophic 
world with a new epistemology and a new cosmology. 
One may ask: Precisely where does James stand in the 
Aaerican world of thought? Is he, for all his novel ideas, only 
another in the long line ot associationists? That he did not 
intend to develop an entirely new position, muoh l.s. to start a 
new "sohool" in opposition to the already-existing school of em-
pirioism, seem. likely from the following .tatement: 
It [hi. poaitioq] is es.entially a mosaio philosophy, a 
philosophy of plural tacts, like that of HUme and hi. 
descendants, who rerer the.e facts neither to Substance. 
in which they adhere nor to an Absolute Mind that cr.at.s 
them as its object •• But it ditfers trom the .HUm1an type 
of empiriCism in one particular which make. me add the 
34 James, Bssay. in Radical !!pirici •• , 65. 
35 Ibid., 65. 
-
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epithet radlcal.36 
Thi. "one partioular," as he go •• on to say, ia the inolusion ot 
every d1reotly experienced element. Hia ohiet objeotion to the 
ordinarr empiricism had been ita tendency to stress the disJunc-
tive elements in experience and to ignore the oonjunotive 
elements. It was on this very point ot relation. that he parted 
company with his associationi.t predeces.or.. As Townsend ob-
.erves, "He correoted the atomi.m ot a.sociationist psyohology 
and disoovered continuities in the mental life whioh Hume, with 
hi. more rigoroua logic, had been unable to observe."37 It was, 
as we have seen, the influenoe ot Darwin and Spenoer which led 
lames to reject the "mental chemistry" ot the assooiationist 
school a8 both untrue to the faota ot introspective exp.rience 
and inadaquate to explain the mental prooesses. This rejection 
ot psyohic atomism va. definite, final, and oomplete, and Jam •••• 
aubstitute, the "stream ot thought," beoame tor subs.quent .m-
piricists the acoepted .xplanation of mental proce •• e.. Henc. 
36 Ibid., 42 • 
............ 
37 Town. end , Philolophical Idea. in the UnIted Stat •• , 142. ot. lame., Bs.all In RadIcal !i~IrIcIsi; 4'i "Serkel.y's 
nominalia., BUme'. Itatemint tbit vSa ever thinss v. di.tinguish 
are .a 'loose and separat.' as it th., had 'no manner ot conneo-
tion,' J .... Mlllts denial that aimilar8 have anything 'really' 
in common, the resolution ot the causal tie into habitual 
sequ.nc., John Mill's acoount ot both physical things and selves 
.s compos.d ot disoontinuous po.sibilities, and the general pul-
verization ot all Experience by asaociation and the Ddnd-duat 
theory, are .xampl •• ot what I mean." 
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we may say that, although James did not intend to break with his 
predecessors, he did in errect profoundly change the current 
trends both on the psychological level, with his "stream ot 
thought," and on the metaphysical level, with hi. "pure experi-
enoe." 
A second question which might present itselt i8 that 
conoerning the epistemological problem. Did James actually suc-
ceed in solving that problem by his theory ot "pure experience"? 
On this point there is such contusion, both in the wr1tings or 
James himself and 1n the writings ot his followers, that any 
direct answer i. impo.sible. The theory ot "pure exper1ence" was 
developed, a. all w111 grant, with one purpose 1n mind: that ot 
solving the epistemological problem. This singleness of purpose 
seems to have been the root of the ditficult1e. which followed 
the statement of the theory. If lames had not been so eager to 
apply h1s theory to the problem at hand, but had taken the t1me 
to work out in detail its metaphysical imp11cat1ons, many ot hi. 
difficulties and those of hi. tollowers would neVer have arisen. 
The first of the.e ditfioult1es is found in the very 
expression "pure experience." This term 1s open to two interpre-
tationa, metaphysical and epistemological. taken in the meta-
pby.ical .en.e, "pure experience" signifies a type of pure being. 
Such an interpretat10n has be.n followed and developed by many 
membera ot the Beo-real1st group, including EdWin B. Bolt, Ralph 
Barton Perr1, and William P. MOntague. Hore recently, Willi .. 
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lavery made use ot this interpretation in establishing his posi-
tion on "ooncatenism."38 James gives detinite indications whioh 
would substantiate suoh an interpretation when, tor example, he 
describe. "pure experience" as "plain, unqualitied actuality or 
existence, a simple that."39 Again he says that it is "a torm ot 
........... 
being whioh is as yet neutral or ambiguous, and prior to the ob-
ject and subjeot distinction."40 In this sense, "pure experi-
enoe" .eema to be similar to the soholastic concept ot "being") 
and it James had developed this novel inSight, it would have 
given him a much-needed metaphYSical toundation tor his resultant 
philosophio theoriea. 
"Pure experience" taken in the .pistemo10gioa1 sen •• 
seems to be reality whioh ~ be known, at that preCise aoment in 
time at whioh it ia known. Reterring to this sen •• ot the term, 
Jame. lays: "The instant tie1d ot the pre.ent is at all times 
what I call 'pure- experience."41 ae attempts to explain this 
38 William Savery, "Coneatenism," The Journal ot Philo· 
so~, XXXIV, Ho. 13, June 24, 1937. Mr. Saviri, aI.cussmg £he 
co ict between monism and pluralism, says: "At the beginning ot 
the last deoade ot the nineteenth century the triumph ot moni •• 
over pluralism seemed to be complete. Then came a turning point 
in philosophy. Oharles Peirce proposed his synechiam • • • and • 
• • William Jamea developed this into his theory ot coneatena-
tion." 
39 James, Basals ~ Radieal !!pirici .. , 23. 
40 Perry, ~ Thought ~ Oharaeter ~ William James, 
II, 385. 
41 : .. es, Essals in Radioal Empiriciam, 23. 
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ve~7 ditficult concept in the tollowing passage, whe~e he s.ys 
that. given portion ot experience 
••• taken In one context ot aS80ciates, plays the 
part ot • knower, ot a state ot mind, ot 'conscious-
ne.s t ; while In a dlfferent context the same undivlded 
blt ot experience plays the part ot a thing known, ot 
an objectlve 'content.' In a word, In one ~oup it 
figures as a thought, in anothe~ ~oup as a thing. And, 
slnce it can flgu~e in both groups simultaneously we 
have every ~ight to speak of It as subjective and ob-jective both at once.42 
P.~t ot the dltflculty in this matte~ comes from the connotation 
of the term "expe~ience." The wo~d is commonly taken in the sub-
Jective sense, .0 muoh so that it i8 extremely difficult to con-
ceive in the ab.t~act, objectlve .en.e, apa~t from a pe~.on o~ a 
thing having the experience. It i. doubttul whethe~ James 
himselt ever completely distlnguished in his own mind the notion. 
ot "pure experience" and subjective expe~ience, and the tact that 
he was continually accused ot subjectivism and even ot solipsis. 
i. proot enough that this theory was anything but clear to hi. 
re.dera. As. consequence he was to~ced to spend the major pa~t 
ot his time atter the appearance ot the article. p~opounding the 
theo~y ot "pure expe~lence" in detense ot the theory itselt. To 
cite only one example, Protessor Wa~ner Fit. understood James to 
mean subjective experience, and James ~eplied: "Pu~e expe~lence 
tor me ant.datea the distinction. It is M7 name to~ your ambigu-
ous ~.ality t~om whlch, whe~.v.r conceptually developed, the two 
Ibld., 10 • 
............ 
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sot. of data come. b 43 Bere we see James appealing to the meta-
physical aspect ot hi. theory tor an explanation of the true 
nature of "pure experienee." Such a re-aa.ertion of its meta-
physioal nature olarifies the basic notion of "pure experience," 
but it hardly explains the difficult epistemological application. 
In addition to the contusion arising from his termi-
nology in the notion ot "pure experience," James clouded the 
matter even more by continual lapa.s into the thought and expres-
aion ot his former idealism. AI late as 1905 we find him toying 
with the idea that perhaps his "pure experience" ia, atter all, 
in lome s.nse subjective. He lays, "Cal11ng the stuff 'experi-
ence' implie. that 1t lhould be e1ther witnessed or w1tnessable • 
• • "44 This queation involved the d1fficulty ot explaining thol. 
experiencea which were beyond the mental reach ot man. They 
would, James thought, oonsi.t ot further experienoeal but who •• ? 
On this pOint Perry observe., "It would have been more oonsiltent 
it James had rejected thia aa a tals. question. Por it pure ex-
perienoe is prior to consciousness and selt, then the personal 
pronoun is not applioable to it."45 
II, 391. 
43 Perry, Th. Thought and Character of William Jame., 
Perry quote.-a letter from James to Protes80r Fi£e. 
44 Ibid., II, 756. The quotation i8 trom the personal 
notes ot James an the Miller-Bode controversy. 
45 Perry, Th. Thought and Oharacter ot William Jame., 
Brieter Veraion, 278.--- ---
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Thus we have seen the development at the "stream at 
thought" tram an analysis at the nature at the mind-proce.s to an 
all-encompasaing metaphysical setting tor a new theory ot know-
ledge. We have seen the ettects, both good and bad, ot Jame.'s 
eclectic education: hi. eminent readability, hi. richness ot 
variety, his brilliant tlashes at insightf and on the other hand, 
hia occasionally contused thought, somewhat disorganized develop-
ment, and trequently inaccurate presentation. These qualitie. 
have made him what he i., namely, the best known and most widely 
read American philosopher in the eye. ot the public, and at the 
aame time a problematic enigma in the eyes ot serious .cholars. 
James cannot be said to have founded any philosophic school in 
the strict s8n.8, but on tne other hand he has perhaps had, di-
rectly and indirectly, more influence on American thought ot the 
past fifty years than any other single man. In his writings are 
found both the final expression ot two centuries ot association-
ism and the seeds ot both behaviorism and functionalism~ and 
Jame. will remain, with all his detects and shortcomings, the 
tather ot that reali8m which i8 characteri8tic ot American philo-
sophy todaYe 
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